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THE FAILURE  of the U.S. trade  deficit  to show marked  improvement  after 
two years of a falling  dollar  has become a major  source of strain  in the 
politics of economic  policy. Frustrated  with the persistence  of the trade 
deficit,  the administration  has demanded  reflation  by unwilling  German 
and Japanese  governments.  Congressional  calls for protectionist  mea- 
sures have become increasingly  strident.  Also at stake is the credibility 
of mainstream  economists. Since signs of a deterioration  in U.S. trade 
performance  became clear-cut in 1982, most economists have argued 
that the fault lay in the strong  dollar, not in other popular  villains such 
as foreign  countries'  industrial  policies. Further,  the role of the dollar  in 
causing the trade deficit is a key part of the widely accepted doctrine 
that links trade  deficits to the federal  budget  deficit. If the trade deficit 
remains  intractable,  this doctrine,  which has served as a potent defense 
against nationalistic views of the trade problem, will soon lose  its 
effectiveness. 
The purpose  of this paper  is to analyze  the puzzling  persistence  of the 
trade deficit. We consider and reject several ideas that have recently 
become  popular  in explaining  that  persistence, and  conclude  that  a valid 
explanation  has three main parts. First is the accepted view that there 
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are substantial  lags in the adjustment  of both prices and quantities  to 
exchange rates, probably  representing  a tendency of firms to commit 
themselves  to suppliers  for extended  periods  of time. The effect of these 
lags has been heightened by the timing of the dollar's rise and fall: 
because the dollar  rose steeply before it began falling, firms  were still 
adjusting  to the strength  of the dollar  and shifting  to foreign suppliers 
even as the dollar  fell. Second, the failure  of foreign  demand  to grow as 
rapidly  as U.S. demand  since 1980  means that, other things equal, the 
dollar  would have to fall below its 1980  level to restore the 1980  trade 
position. Finally, the evidence suggests that even if both the real 
exchange rate and relative demand  were restored to their 1980  levels, 
the trade  balance  would still not return  to its original  position. At least 
in the years before 1980,  there  appears  to have been a secular  decline in 
the U.S. real  exchange  rate  consistent  with any given trade  balance,  but 
we have been unable  to extract  clear  evidence of such  a continuing  trend 
from  the data. 
The paper  is in six parts.  The first  part  reviews some basic facts about 
U.S. trade  performance,  especially since the turnaround  of the dollar  in 
the first quarter of  1985. The second part addresses three widely 
circulated  views about  the reasons for a persistent  trade  deficit  that can 
be confronted and rejected without formal econometric testing. The 
third  part  presents some "conventional  econometrics" on U.S. trade, 
estimating  a simple  model of the nonagricultural,  nonoil trade  balance. 
The fourth  part  considers  the issue of lags, presenting  and testing some 
alternative  views about the reasons for long lags in both prices and 
quantities.  The fifth  part  addresses  the possibility of a downward  trend 
in the equilibrium  exchange  rate  and  asks whether  the strong  dollar  itself 
shifted  down the equilibrium  exchange rate. The last part  of the paper 
pulls  the results  together  for an overall  assessment. 
Background  on the Trade Deficit 
As a preliminary  to the discussion of the causes of the trade  deficit's 
persistence,  we review some basic facts about the U.S. trade  position. 
These facts may be grouped  under  four subjects: exchange rate devel- 
opments,  trade  volumes, trade  prices, and the trade  balance  itself. Paul R. Krugman and Richard E. Baldwin  3 
Figure 1.  The Real Exchange Value of the U.S.  Dollar,  1975:1-1987:1a 
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Source:  Authors' calculations.  Exchange  rate and price data are from International Monetary Fund, International 
Financial  Statistics,  various issues.  Manufacturing trade data are from U.S.  Department of Commerce,  International 
Trade Administration,  United States  Trade: Performance  in 1985 and Outlook (Government  Printing Office,  1986). 
a.  The real exchange  rate expresses  the ratio of the dollar price of U.S.  goods  to the dollar price of foreign goods 
and is  here calculated  as  the  quarterly average  exchange  rate for the  U.S.  dollar against the  currencies  of  Japan, 
Canada, France,  Germany,  Italy, the United  Kingdom,  South Korea,  and Taiwan,  weighted by  1984 shares of U.S. 
manufacturing  trade  and  deflated  by  wholesale  prices  of  manufactures  for  industrial  countries,  and  by  overall 
wholesale  prices for South Korea and Taiwan. 
EXCHANGE  RATES 
Figure 1 presents a measure of the U.S.  real exchange rate for 
manufactures.  The index includes  the currencies  of six industrial  coun- 
tries, plus Korea and Taiwan, weighted  by 1984  bilateral  manufactures 
trade  with the United States. Prices are measured  by wholesale prices 4  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1987 
for  manufactures  for  the industrial  countries,  by wholesale  prices  overall 
for Korea  and  Taiwan. 
The  fall in the real  dollar  since its 1985:  1  peak  has essentially  reversed 
all of its rise from 1980. Some confusion has been created in popular 
discussion by exchange rate indexes that show little fall in the dollar. 
Figure 1 shows that the dollar has indeed fallen sharply, to levels no 
higher  on average  than  those of the late 1970s.  I 
The overall  fall in the dollar's  real exchange  rate, however, conceals 
disparities  in its movements  against  currencies  of different  countries;  in 
particular,  the real  dollar  has  fallen  sharply  against  currencies  of Western 
Europe  and  Japan,  reaching  a record  low against  the  yen, while  remaining 
relatively stable against currencies of both Canada and the newly 
industrializing  countries (South Korea and Taiwan). These disparities 
raise a caution about speaking  loosely about "the" exchange rate: a 1 
percent  decline  in one exchange  rate  index may not mean  at all the same 
thing  as a 1  percent  decline in another. 
Another  important  feature  of the exchange  rate  for understanding  the 
persistence of the trade deficit may also be seen in figure 1: the dollar 
rose sharply  just before it fell. The two-year decline in the dollar  since 
the first quarter  of 1985  followed a four-and-one-half-year  rise, which 
was marked  by a sharp  run-up  in the  last three  quarters.  (Many  observers 
regard  this final  run-up  in the dollar  as a speculative  bubble, but that is 
outside the scope of this paper.) The fact that the fall came after a rise 
meant  that U.S. trade  flows had not fully adjusted  to the strength  of the 
dollar in early 1985, and lagged responses to the rising dollar before 
1985:1  are crucial  to understanding  the peculiar  dynamics  since then. 
It is also important  to note that the strong dollar of the 1980s was 
actually not all that strong in the light of historical experience. The 
exchange  rate  peak  in 1985,  universally  regarded  as representing  a severe 
overvaluation  relative to the rate needed to achieve current account 
balance, in fact was by some measures  about the same as the exchange 
rate  of 1970,  which  appears  to have  been consistent  with  current  account 
balance. This observation suggests a secular downward  trend in the 
exchange  rate  consistent  with any given U.S. external  balance. 
1. For some systematic  comparisons  of indexes with and without  LDCs, see Martin 
Feldstein and Philippe  Bochetta, "How Far Has the Dollar Really Fallen?" Working 
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Figure 2.  Nonagricultural Export and Nonoil Import Volumes, United States, 
1980:1-1986:4a 
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Accounts  of  the  United  States,  1929-82  Statistical  Tables  (GPO,  1986), and Survey  of  Cu4rrent  Business,  vol.  66 
(July 1986), and vol.  67 (March 1987). 
a.  Natural logarithms of nonagricultural exports  and nonoil imports in 1982 dollars. 
TRADE  VOLUMES 
When  the trade  balance  worsened  following  the dollar's  devaluation, 
many observers  regarded  it as an example of the famous "J-curve," in 
which a sluggish response of export and import volumes that would 
improve  the trade  balance  at unchanged  prices is at first  outweighed  by 
valuation  effects. Thus it is important  to note that the U.S. experience 
with trade  deficit  worsening  following  a dollar  decline is not, or at least 
not yet, aJ-curve. Until  the last quarter  of 1986,  trade  volumes  were still 
moving  in the wrong  direction. 
Figure  2 shows logarithms  of constant  dollar  nonagricultural  exports 
and nonoil imports  since 1980.  We focus on the nonagricultural-nonoil 
balance  rather  than  the overall  trade  balance  for  two main  reasons. First, 
both the oil and agricultural  markets have been subject to  special 6  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1987 
developments  that  would  require  extended  analysis  that  would  make  the 
paper  unwieldy. If those markets  were the key to the persistence of the 
deficit, the detour would be unavoidable, but in fact the puzzle of 
deteriorating  trade  performance  is perfectly  clear  in the nonagricultural- 
nonoil numbers  as well as in the total. Second, much of the discussion 
of U.S. competitive problems has focused on manufacturing,  and we 
would like to focus on a measure that mostly reflects manufacturing 
trade; while it would in principle  be better to focus on manufacturing 
alone, the nonagricultural-nonoil  data are both more carefully con- 
structed  and  more  up-to-date  than  manufacturing  price  and  volume  data. 
The  figure  makes  two points. First, import  volume  not only continued 
to rise after the dollar's  peak, it continued  to rise about as rapidly  as it 
had  in the year before  the peak, at about  a 10  percent  annual  rate. Given 
U.S. GNP growth  at only a 3 percent  annual  rate over the same period, 
the continuing  rapid  rise in import  volume is fairly  startling. 
Second, while export volume rose in the year following  the dollar's 
turnaround,  it continued to rise more slowly than import volume; 
furthermore,  it actually  rose less rapidly  in the seven quarters  between 
1985:1  and 1986:4  than  it did in the year  before the dollar's  peak. 
Any explanation  of the persistence of the U.S.  trade deficit must 
explain  why trade  volumes were still moving  the wrong  way for at least 
a year and  a half  after  the dollar  began  to fall. 
TRADE  PRICES 
The puzzle of perverse trade volumes may be linked to a second 
puzzle, that of pricing  on the import  side. Figure 3 shows an index of 
U.S.  nonoil import prices deflated by U.S.  manufactures  wholesale 
prices and  an index of the real  import  exchange  rate, using  foreign  CPIs 
and  the GNP deflator.  What  is immediately  obvious  is that  until  late 1986 
there  was essentially  no discernible  effect of the exchange  rate  on import 
prices. Foreign producers must have been taking large cuts in profit 
margins  rather  than raise the dollar  prices of their goods in the United 
States. The practice is most apparent  for Japan,  where manufacturing 
unit labor costs in dollars  rose 5.7 percent from 1985:1  to 1986:4  even 
while manufactures  export  prices fell 23.4 percent. 
The picture  on the export side has been different.  If U.S. producers 
were, like foreign producers, to react to an exchange rate change by 
"pricingto  market"  -holding  prices  stable  in  the  purchaser's  currency- Paul R.  Krugman and Richard E. Baldwin  7 
Figure 3.  The Real Import Exchange Rate and Real Nonoil Import Prices, United States, 
1980:1-1986:4 
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Source: Authors' calculations  with data from Survey  of  Current  Business,  various issues, and from IMF, 
International  Financial  Statistics,  various  issues. 
a. Exchange  value of the dollar  deflated  by relative  import  prices, calculated  here as the ratio  of the dollar  price 
of U.S. goods (GNP  deflator)  to the dollar  price  of foreign  goods (consumer  prices). 
b. U.S. nonoil  import  prices  deflated  by U.S. manufactures  wholesale  prices. 
U.S. export  prices in dollars  would  have surged  since early 1985.  In fact 
they have remained  stable in dollar  terms. Apparently  U.S. producers 
have by and large not taken advantage  of the dollar's fall to increase 
profit  margins. 
THE  TRADE  DEFICIT 
There are two useful measures  of the overall nonagricultural-nonoil 
trade  deficit. The first  is the actual or nominal  deficit;  the second is the 
"real"  deficit,  defined  as exports  minus  imports  measured  in 1982  dollars. 
The real deficit represents  an index of the combined  effects of changes 
in  export  and  import  volumes,  leaving  aside  price  changes;  the difference 
between  the real  and  nominal  deficits  can be taken  as a measure  of terms- 
of-trade  effects. 8  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1987 
From  the dollar's  peak  in 1985:  1  to 1986:4  the  nominal  nonagricultural- 
nonoil deficit  rose from $81 billion  to $150 billion, while the real deficit 
rose from $93 billion  to $136  billion. This  joint rise reflects  the fact that 
the United States has not, or at least not yet, experienced  a J-curve, in 
which sluggish  adjustment  of the real trade deficit  is offset at first by a 
worsening  of the terms of trade. The real deficit has moved the wrong 
way, while, because of the asymmetrical  behavior  of import  and export 
prices, there  has been little change  in the terms  of trade. 
Common Beliefs about the Trade Deficit 
The failure  of the trade  deficit to fall despite the dollar's  decline has 
led to wide circulation  of explanations  that either deny the actuality  of 
dollar  decline or dismiss it as irrelevant.  The three most influential  are 
that the dollar  has not really  fallen  against  a broad  basket of currencies; 
that resolution of the trade deficit depends not on the dollar but on 
foreign economic growth, which has been insufficient;  and that trade 
balances  reflect  differences  between  income  and  spending,  and  exchange 
rates  are  irrelevant.  All three  explanations  have considerable  appeal  and 
touch upon valid points. However, each can be rejected  as the central 
explanation  of the puzzle. 
HAS  THE  DOLLAR  REALLY  FALLEN? 
Considerable  press attention  was given in 1986  to the publication  by 
the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas of an exchange rate index that 
included 131 countries, rather than the limited group of  industrial 
countries  covered by most widely circulated  indexes.2  According  to the 
Dallas index, the dollar had hardly declined at all from its early 1985 
peak, a finding  that was widely cited as a key explanation  of the failure 
of the trade  balance  to improve. 
The reason for the dollar's strong showing in the Dallas index was 
that  while it had  depreciated  sharply  against  the currencies  of Japan  and 
Western  Europe, the currencies  of many less developed countries  had 
actually  depreciated  against  the dollar. In particular,  if countries were 
2. W. Michael Cox, "A New Alternative  Trade-Weighted  Dollar Exchange Rate 
Index,"  Economic Review of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas  (September  1986), pp. 
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weighted  by their  trade  with the United States, the continuing  deprecia- 
tion of the currencies of Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina  largely out- 
weighed  the rise of the yen and European  currencies. 
It was immediately  obvious to international  economists, however, if 
not to the news media, that the sharp depreciation  of high-inflation 
currencies  did not explain  the persistence  of the U.S. trade  deficit. Cost 
competitiveness depends on the real exchange rate, not the nominal 
rate, and the huge nominal  depreciations  of Latin American  currencies 
had not been matched by corresponding  real depreciations. A real 
exchange  rate  index shows a large  dollar  decline even with LDCs in the 
index. The index shown in figure  1, in fact, includes  the most important 
LDC exporters of manufactures, South Korea and Taiwan, with a 
significant  weight.  Nonetheless, it shows a sharp  dollar  depreciation  that 
has essentially  reversed  the 1980-85  rise. 
THE  ROLE  OF  FOREIGN  GROWTH 
The need for foreign  growth  to create demand  for U.S. exports has 
been  a central  theme  of U. S. official  pronouncements  on the trade  deficit. 
Both Paul  Volcker  and  James  Baker  have placed strong  emphasis  on the 
need for faster growth  in Europe and Japan,  and at times the Treasury 
has used the threat  of a falling  dollar  as a goad to Germany  and  Japan  to 
reflate  their economies. Other  authorities  have emphasized  the impor- 
tance of demand  from LDCs, placing weight on the link between the 
debt  problem  and  the trade  deficit. 
One  might  expect that  an  issue given  such  prominence  in  policy debate 
must necessarily  be of major  importance.  Yet while it is true that faster 
growth abroad would help resolve the U.S.  trade deficit, and while 
divergence  between U.S. and foreign demand  growth contributed  sig- 
nificantly  to the emergence  of the U.S. trade  deficit, the possible extent 
to which foreign  demand  growth  could be expected to reduce the trade 
deficit, and thus the extent to which limited foreign demand can be 
assigned a key role in the persistence of the U.S.  deficit, is almost 
certainly  quite  limited. 
We will document  this point  with econometric  evidence later, but  the 
argument  can be made with a simple  back-of-the-envelope  calculation. 
Indeed,  for those who distrust  econometrics, such a calculation  may be 
more persuasive than the more careful documentation.  In the fourth 
quarter of  1986, in nominal terms, U.S.  imports of  nonpetroleum 10  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1987 
products  exceeded U.S. exports  of nonagricultural  goods by 74 percent. 
(In the late 1970s, by contrast, nonagricultural  exports consistently 
exceeded nonoil imports.) Suppose that all foreign countries were 
somehow  persuaded  to expand  their  domestic  demand  5 percent  relative 
to what it would otherwise have been. Since imports  from the United 
States are only a small fraction of the rest of world income, such an 
expansion  in demand  without  a dollar  depreciation  would fall primarily 
on foreign goods, leading  to an increase of foreign output of at least 4 
percent-which  for most countries exceeds the maximum  that they 
believe can be achieved without creating  dangerous  inflationary  pres- 
sure.3  Suppose also that the elasticity of U.S. exports with respect to 
foreign real expenditure  is 3, which is well above most estimates (our 
preferred  estimate  is 2.1 -see  below). Then this unlikely  large  reflation 
would  increase  U.S. exports 15  percent, only 20 percent  of the increase 
needed  to restore  balance  in nonagricultural-nonoil  trade.  Any plausible 
increase  in foreign  growth  would contribute  substantially  less. Thus the 
lack of stronger  foreign  economic  growth,  while not totally  irrelevant,  is 
a secondary  factor  in explaining  the persistence  of the trade  deficit. 
Given the numbers,  one may wonder  why the growth  issue receives 
so much attention. One answer may be simple misunderstanding,  as in 
the case of the confusion over the extent of the dollar's fall. A more 
charitable  explanation  is that  the emphasis  on foreign  growth  represents 
shrewd  politics on the part of U.S. economic officials. Blaming  inade- 
quate  foreign  demand  is a last line of defense against  protectionists  who 
deny the efficacy of the exchange rate in correcting  trade imbalances. 
Furthermore,  the emphasis on foreign demand, and the assertion that 
the dollar  must  fall unless such demand  is provided,  has accomplished  a 
remarkable  public  relations  feat: Secretary  Baker  may  be the first  finance 
minister  in history  to make  currency  devaluation  seem a sign  of strength, 
not weakness. 
THE  RELEVANCE  OF  THE  EXCHANGE  RATE 
Recently an important challenge to the conventional analysis of 
exchange rates has been mounted by monetarist advocates of fixed 
3. The International  Monetary  Fund  estimates  a GNP gap that is less than  4 percent 
for all of the Group  of Seven countries and much less for several. See IMF, World 
Economic  Outlook (IMF, April 1987). Paul  R. Krugman and Richard E. Baldwin  11 
exchange  rates, notably  Robert  Mundell  and Ronald  McKinnon.4  Their 
argument  is that the exchange rate is irrelevant  to trade  balance deter- 
mination. Instead, the trade balance is determined  by the difference 
between national  income and national  expenditure,  or, equivalently,  by 
the difference  between saving  and  investment. 
The Mundell-McKinnon  view goes beyond  asserting  that  the equality 
between the trade balance and the savings-investment  balance is an 
identity. It carries a positive implication:  that the trade balance has 
nothing  to do with the exchange rate and that therefore  the puzzle of a 
falling  dollar  and  a rising  deficit  is no puzzle at all. The view also carries 
a normative  implication:  since exchange rates are irrelevant  to trade 
balance  adjustment,  they should  be fixed  in order  to achieve other  aims, 
notably  price stability. 
Since their  view has gained  considerable  influence  in policy circles, it 
is important  to consider it carefully. In fact, the Mundell-McKinnon 
view is logically wrong in its dismissal of any puzzle in the exchange 
rate-trade link and is almost surely empirically wrong in its policy 
message. To see why, it is helpful  to have a rudimentary  model  in which 
the consequences of assumptions  can be fully worked  out. 
A Simple Model. In a world economy consisting of two countries, 
the United States and the rest of the world (ROW), each country is 
assumed to produce a single good that is both consumed domestically 
and exported. We let ROW's output be numeraire  and define  p as the 
relative  price of the U.S. good. 
In Mundell's and McKinnon's discussions there is an implicit as- 
sumption  of full employment  and constant output. The assumption  is 
not realistic,  but  to do away with it would create  the impression  that  this 
is another  Keynesian-classical  dispute, which it is not. So let us assume 
that the United States produces a fixed output  y and ROW  produces a 
fixed  output  y*. 
The determination  of demand  is another  issue that is important  but 
not central  to understanding  the exchange rate-trade  balance linkage. 
Let us therefore  treat  total U.S. expenditure,  measured  in terms of the 
4. Robert  A. Mundell,  "A New Deal on Exchange  Rates," paper  presented  at Japan- 
United States Symposium  on Exchange Rates and Macroeconomics  (Tokyo, Japan, 
January  29-30, 1987);  and  Ronald  I. McKinnon  and  Kenichi  Ohno,  "Getting  the Exchange 
Rate Right:  Insular  versus Open Economies," paper presented at the meeting of the 
American  Economic  Association,  December  1986. 12  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1987 
U.S. good, as a parameter,  a. For the world as a whole income must 
equal expenditure.  Thus if a* is ROW  expenditure,  measured  in terms 
of the ROW  good, it must be true  that 
(1)  pa  +  a* =py  +y*,or 
a* = y* + p(y  -  a). 
Now it is certainly  true  as an  accounting  identity  that  the trade  balance 
is equal  to the excess of income over expenditure,  so that  the U.S. trade 
balance, t, in terms  of the U.S. good, is simply 
(2)  t = y -  a, 
an expression  in which  the relative  price  of U.S. goods does not directly 
appear. 
The absence of that  term  does not, however, allow us to forget  about 
relative prices. There is still a requirement  that the market for U.S. 
output clear, in which case the market  for ROW  output  clears as well, 
by Walras's  Law. Each country  will divide its expenditure  between the 
two goods. For simplicity, let us make the Cobb-Douglas  assumption 
that expenditure  shares are fixed, with the United States spending a 
share m of its income on imports  and 1 -  m on domestic output, and 
ROW  spending  m* on imports  and 1 -  m* on domestic  goods. Then we 
can write  the market-clearing  condition  as 
(3)  py = (1 -  m)pa + m*a*, or 
p[y -(1-  m)a] =  m*a* =  m*[y*  + p(y  -  a)], 
implying 
(4)  p  =  m*a*/D, where 
D  =  (1 -  m)y -  (1 -  m -  m*)a. 
The implications  of this small  model are illustrated  in figure  4, which 
is much more general than the example. On the horizontal  axis is the 
U.S. level of real expenditure  a; on the vertical  axis is the relative  price 
of U.S.  output  p. The line TT is an iso-trade-balance  line, that is, it 
represents  a locus of points consistent with some given trade  balance  in 
terms of U.S.  output. The accounting  identity that equates the trade 
balance to income minus expenditure,  regardless  of relative prices, is 
reflected  by the  fact  that  TTis  vertical.  Meanwhile,  the  line UUrepresents 
points  of market  clearing  for U.S. output.  It is here  drawn  with  a positive Paul  R. Krugman and Richard E. Baldwin  13 
Figure 4.  Relative Price Adjustment 
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slope, which will be the case if (1 -  m) >  m*, that is, if U.S. residents 
have a higher  marginal  propensity  to spend on U.S. output  than ROW 
residents  do. Point  E is the equilibrium  for a given trade  balance. 
Is There  a Puzzle? The  first  part  of the Mundell-McKinnon  argument, 
to repeat,  is that  one should  not be surprised  by the failure  of devaluation 
to improve  the U.S. trade position. Devaluation  is irrelevant,  because 
the trade balance is determined  by the income-expenditure  balance. 
That  is, at a point like E' in figure  4 the relative  price of U. S  . output  has 
fallen, but U.S. expenditure  has not, so there will not be a reduction  in 
the trade  deficit. 
It should be immediately  clear what is wrong with this argument:  it 
fails to look at the whole story. If we observe what looks like a move 
from  E to E', we should  be puzzled, because E' is not an equilibrium:  it 
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the puzzle as one of the failure  of demand  for U.S. output  to rise rather 
than  one of the failure  of the U.S. trade  balance  to improve, but this is 
simply  logic-chopping.  The point is that any fully described  model will 
determine  the relative  price of U.S. goods, and must offer some expla- 
nation  of how it is possible for it to have fallen with a rising  U.S. trade 
deficit. An accounting  identity  does not set relative  prices free to move 
without  real  consequences. 
What  Mundell,  McKinnon,  and  others  holding  similar  views probably 
believe is that exchange  rate changes do not in fact produce  changes in 
relative  prices. That  is, a nominal  depreciation  is not a real  depreciation. 
A devaluation might briefly push the world economy to E', but the 
resulting excess demand  for U.S.  output and excess supply of ROW 
output  would quickly  lead to some mix of inflation  in the United States 
and deflation  in ROW  that  returned  the world  economy to E. 
If this is the argument,  however, any claim that the expenditure- 
income  balance  approach  helps explain  what  has happened  over the past 
two years  becomes clearly  false. For  as we have documented,  the decline 
in the dollar  so far  has indeed  been reflected  in a large  decline  in the price 
of U.S. output  relative  to the price of ROW  output.  Thus  in terms  of the 
figure we have moved from E to E'. Yet there has been no surge of 
excess  demand for U.S.  output-to  the contrary. No appeal to the 
Saving-Investment-Trade  balance  identity,  S  -  I  =  X  -  M,  can do 
away with the need to understand  why the relative  price of U.S. goods 
has fallen so much  without  any visible substitution  from  foreign  to U.S. 
goods. 
The Need for  Exchange  Rate  Adjustment.  The  second  part of the 
Mundell-McKinnon  argument  is that  since the trade  balance  depends  on 
the income-expenditure  balance, not the exchange  rate, exchange  rates 
should be set to ensure price stability rather  than varied to facilitate 
trade  adjustment.  Unlike the dismissal  of any real exchange  rate-trade 
balance connection, this view need not be wrong on a logical level. 
However, Mundell  and  McKinnon  both  treat  it as something  necessarily 
true,  which  it is not. It is an empirical  issue, on which  their  view is almost 
surely  wrong. 
If the picture  is as we have drawn  it in figure  4, a reduction  in the U.S. 
trade  deficit  will necessarily  be accompanied  by a decline in the relative 
price of U.S. output. In the figure,  a reduction  of U.S. real expenditure 
shifts  TTinward  to T'  T';  this shift  requires  that  the equilibrium  shift  from 
E to E",  which involves a fall in the relative  price  p. Paul R.  Krugman and Richard E. Baldwin  15 
Figure 5.  Expenditures, Substitution Effects, and Relative Price Adjustment 
Relative  price of  U.S.  output 
T 
U  U 
T 
U.S.  real expenditure 
Now there are two circumstances  in which this relative  price adjust- 
ment need not take place. The first, the case in which U.S. and ROW 
goods are perfect substitutes,  can surely be dismissed  pretty much out 
of hand, on the basis of casual observation, on the basis of the huge 
relative  price movements  of the 1980s,  and on the basis of econometric 
evidence  like that  presented  later  that  indicates,  if anything,  that substi- 
tution effects in trade are surprisingly  small. The other is the case in 
which spending  patterns are identical between the countries, so that 
(1 -  m) =  m*. In either case, the effect is to make UU horizontal (figure 
5), so that  a reduction  in U.S. expenditure  need not be accompanied  by 
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The case of identical spending patterns is famous in international 
economics  as Bertil  Ohlin's  position  on the transfer  problem.  It relies on 
the view that as expenditure  falls in the United States and rises abroad, 
foreign  residents  will spend  as much  of their  incremental  income  on U.S. 
goods as the reduction  in U.S. spending  on these goods. After decades 
of analysis of this point, it is also clear why this will not happen in 
practice. Briefly, because most output is not traded, residents of each 
country  will spend relatively  more of their  income on local goods, both 
on average and at the margin. If U.S.  expenditure  were to fall $150 
billion,  while expenditure  in the rest of the world  rose the same  amount, 
U.S. residents would cut their demand  for U.S. goods something  like 
$125  billion  while foreigners  would raise their spending  on U.S. output 
no more  than  $25  billion.  A fall in the relative  price of U.S. goods would 
be necessary to close the resulting  $100  billion  excess supply. 
The relative price changes that trade adjustment  requires  need not 
come through exchange rate adjustment. They could come instead 
through  inflation  in the country  that increases its spending  or deflation 
in the other country. One wonders whether even an economist who 
believed in flexible prices would regard  either of these alternatives  as 
the desirable  route. In any case, price inertia  gives a strong  reason for 
preferring  to adjust  the exchange  rate. 
The Conventional  Econometrics  of the Trade Balance 
In this section we set out some basic, "conventional" econometric 
analysis of the U.S. nonagricultural-nonoil  trade balance. By conven- 
tional we mean that it follows the approaches  taken by standard  fore- 
casting equations. Real expenditures and prices of goods other than 
those of U.S. imports and exports are taken as exogenous. Lags are 
estimated on an ad hoc basis, unconstrained  by any formal dynamic 
model. The experience with volatile exchange rates since 1970  has in 
important  respects been a vindication  for such conventional  modeling. 
With plenty of  variation in the data even  the  simplest estimation 
techniques  yield plausible  results, and  the simple  equations  have by and 
large successfully tracked  the impact  of the exchange rate on the trade 
balance. Paul R.  Krugman and Richard E. Baldwin  17 
Table 1.  Determinants of Nonagricultural Export Volume, Selected Periods, 
1977:2-1986:4a 
Independent  variable  Elasticity 
and summary statistic  1977:2-1985:1  1977:2-1986:4 
Foreign  real expenditure  2.47 (0.18)  2.42 (0.13) 
Real exchange  rate (sum of lags)  -  1.40 (0.13)  -  1.33 (0.11) 
Lags: 0  -  0.29 (0.09)  -  0.23 (0.05) 
1  -0.25  (0.05)  -0.21  (0.03) 
2  -0.21  (0.03)  -0.19  (0.02) 
3  -0.18  (0.02)  -0.17  (0.01) 
4  -0.14  (0.03)  -0.15  (0.02) 
5  -  0.11 (0.04)  -0.12  (0.02) 
6  -0.09  (0.04)  -0.10  (0.02) 
7  - 0.06 (0.04)  - 0.08 (0.02) 
8  -0.04  (0.03)  -0.05  (0.02) 
9  -  0.02 (0.02)  -  0.03 (0.01) 
Summary statistic 
R2  0.904  0.916 
Standard error  0.032  0.033 
Durbin-Watson  0.77  0.72 
Source: Authors'  calculations  with  foreign  real  expenditure  data  supplied  by the Board  of Governors  of the Federal 
Reserve;  exchange  rate  and  price  data  from  the International  Monetary  Fund  and  from  IMF,  International  Financial 
Statistics,  various  issues;  and  manufacturing  trade  data  used in the exchange  rate  calculations  from  U.S. Department 
of  Commerce,  International  Trade  Administration,  United  States  Trade:  Performance  in  1985  and  Outlook 
(Government  Printing  Office, 1986). 
a. Quarterly  data.  Dependent  variable  is U.S. nonagricultural  export  volume  (in 1982  prices).  Independent  variables 
are defined  as follows. Foreign  real expenditure  is GDP plus imports  minus exports in 1982  prices for eighteen 
countries  weighted  by U.S. export shares;  the real exchange  rate expresses the ratio of the dollar  price of U.S. 
goods to the dollar  price of foreign  goods and is here calculated  as the average  exchange  rate of the U.S. dollar 
against  the currencies  of Japan,  Canada,  France,  Germany,  Italy, the United  Kingdom,  South  Korea,  and Taiwan, 
weighted  by 1984  shares  of U.S. manufacturing  trade  and  deflated  by wholesale  prices  of manufactures  for industrial 
countries  and  by overall  wholesale  prices  for South  Korea  and  Taiwan.  Elasticities  here  and  elsewhere  measure  the 
effect on the dependent  variable  of a 1 percent  change  in the independent  variable.  Numbers  in parentheses  are 
standard  errors. 
TRADE  VOLUMES 
Tables 1 and 2 present simple equations for U.S.  nonagricultural 
export and nonoil import volume. The explanatory  variables are real 
domestic expenditure in the importing  market (defined as GDP plus 
imports  minus exports in 1982  prices) and a distributed  lag on the real 
exchange  rate. 
Many estimated trade equations use GNP rather  than expenditure 
because the data are more readily  available. On grounds  of theoretical 
clarity,  expenditure  is preferable;  in practice, the results are not much 
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Table 2.  Determinants of Nonoil Import Volume, Selected Periods,  1977:2-1986:4a 
Independent  variable  Elasticity 
and summary statistic  1977:2-1985:1  1977:2-1986.4 
U.S. real expenditure  2.78 (0.12)  2.87 (0.12) 
Real exchange  rate (sum of lags)  0.92 (0.13)  0.86 (0.14) 
Lags: 0  0.14 (0.05)  0.03 (0.04) 
1  0.14 (0.03)  0.07 (0.02) 
2  0.13 (0.02)  0.09 (0.02) 
3  0.12 (0.02)  0.11 (0.02) 
4  0.11 (0.02)  0.12 (0.02) 
5  0.09 (0.03)  0.12 (0.02) 
6  0.08 (0.03)  0.11 (0.03) 
7  0.06 (0.03)  0.10 (0.02) 
8  0.04 (0.02)  0.07 (0.18) 
9  0.02 (0.01)  0.04 (0.01) 
Summary statistic 
R2  0.98  0.99 
Standard error  0.025  0.028 
Durbin-Watson  1.71  1.34 
Source: Authors' calculations  with U.S.  expenditure  data from U.S.  Department  of Commerce,  Bureau of 
Economic  Analysis,  The National  Income  and Product  Accounts  of the  United  States,  1929-82  Statistical  Tables 
(GPO, 1986),  and Survey  of Current  Business,  various  issues; exchange  rate  and price  data  from  the IMF  and  from 
Intertiational  Finatncial Statistics,  various  issues;  and  manufacturing  trade  data  used in the exchange  rate  calculations 
from  International  Trade  Administration,  United  States Trade. 
a. Quarterly  data. Dependent  variable  is U.S. nonoil  imports  (in 1982  prices).  Independent  variables  are defined 
as follows. U.S. real  expenditure  is GNP  plus  imports  minus  exports  in 1982  prices;  the real  exchange  rate  expresses 
the ratio  of the dollar  price  of U.S. goods to the dollar  price  of foreign  goods. It is calculated  as described  in table 
1. Numbers  in parentheses  are standard  errors. 
The equations  are estimated  both from 1977:2  to 1985:  1, the dollar's 
peak, and from 1977:2  to the end of 1986. The estimates are not much 
affected  by the  recent  bad  news  about  U. S. trade  performance.  However, 
if the estimates  over the shorter  time  period  are  used to forecast  forward, 
they do predict  a U. S. trade  recovery that  has not yet happened.  Export 
volume in 1986:4 was 5 percent less,  and import volume 7 percent 
greater,  than  these equations  predict;  the real  trade  deficit  was therefore 
$43  billion  larger  than  we would  have predicted. 
One possibility is that there is a secular trend due to technological 
change  that  is not captured  in these equations;  we discuss the theoretical 
rationale  for such a trend below. To test for the trend, we have also 
estimated  the equations  with a trend  term and, for good measure, with 
time squared, to allow for a shifting trend. At first sight, the results, Paul R.  Krugman and Richard E. Baldwin  19 
Table 3.  Alternative Trade Volume Equations,  1977:2-1986:4 
Independent  Elasticity 
variable and  Exports  Imports  Exports  Imports 
summary statistic  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Real expenditurea  5.54  3.08  2.56  2.80 
(0.64)  (0.25)  (1.35)  (0.37) 
Real exchange  rateb  0.23  0.98  -2.77  0.54 
(0.34)  (0.13)  (1.26)  (0.44) 
Timec  -0.024  -0.0028  -  0.036  -0.011 
(0.005)  (0.002)  (0.007)  (0.008) 
Time squared  ...  ...  0.0008  0.0002 
(0.0003)  (0.0002) 
Summary statistic 
R2  0.95  0.99  0.96  0.99 
Standard error  0.025  0.017  0.014  0.016 
Durbin-Watson  1.18  1.94  1.46  1.88 
Source: Authors'  calculations  with data as described  in tables 1 and 2. Numbers  in parentheses  are standard 
errors. 
a. For the export equations,  the variable  is foreign  real expenditure,  as described  in table 1. For the import 
equations,  the variable  is U.S. real  expenditure,  as described  in table  2. 
b. Expresses  the ratio  of the dollar  price  of U.S. goods to the dollar  price  of foreign  goods. It is calculated  as in 
table 1 and  equals  the sum  of a ten-quarter  distributed  lag. 
c.  Equals  1.0 for 1985:1. 
reported  in table  3, suggest  much  less confidence  in the simple  equations. 
Both price and especially income elasticities shift around  considerably; 
in particular,  if the estimate of a foreign demand  elasticity of 5.5 were 
taken  seriously,  it would  considerably  modify  our  conclusion  that  foreign 
reflation  can have only a modest impact  on the trade  deficit. However, 
we suspect that the trend terms are overexplaining  the data, allowing 
random  shocks  and  errors  in variables  to distort  the  results.  An  indication 
is that these equations do much worse than the simpler equations at 
forecasting  out of sample. For example, the equations with a simple 
trend underpredict  1986:4 export volume by  11 percent and import 
volume by  15 percent; the equations with time and time squared 
overpredict  export  volume  by 23  percent  (although  getting  import  volume 
within 2 percent). Thus while additional  terms are significant  in the 
estimation,  we suspect that  the simplest  equations  are to be preferred. 
An  important  implication  of these results  is that  while  price  elasticities 
in trade are clearly significant,  and well outside the Marshall-Lerner 
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Table 4.  Determinants of Nonagricultural Export Prices, Selected Periods, 
1976:2-1986:4a 
Independent  variable  Elasticity 
and summary statistic  1976:2-1985:1  1976:2-1986:4 
Real exchange  rate (sum of lags)  -  0.35 (0.04)  -  0.47 (0.04) 
Lags: 0  -0.11  (0.05)  -0.08  (0.04) 
1  -0.09  (0.02)  -0.04  (0.02) 
2  -0.06  (0.01)  -0.12  (0.01) 
3  -0.04  (0.03)  -0.15  (0.02) 
4  -0.03  (0.03)  -  0.15 (0.02) 
5  -0.01  (0.02)  -0.09  (Q.01) 
Summary statistic 
W2  0.72  0.77 
Standard error  0.014  0.018 
Durbin-Watson  0.51  0.39 
Source: Authors'  calculations  with U.S. export price data from Thle Natiotnal Incomze atnd Product  Accountts, 
1929-82  Statistical  Tables, and  Survey of Cuirrent  Business,  various  issues; manufactures  wholesale  prices  are from 
the IMF. 
a. Quarterly  data. Dependent  variable  is the logarithm  of the ratio  of the U.S. nonagricultural  export  deflator  to 
U.S. manufactures  wholesale  prices.  The real  exchange  rate  expresses  the ratio  of the dollar  price  of U.S. goods to 
the dollar  price  of foreign  goods. It is calculated  as described  in table 1. Numbers  in parentheses  are standard  errors. 
exceed 1, they are  fairly  small-not  too far  above unity. Before  the 1980s 
it was  often difficult to  estimate price effects in trade with much 
confidence,  because of the lack of variation  in the data;  the volatility  of 
the dollar  has now provided  a good experiment.  What  is clear from the 
estimates is that the Mundell-McKinnon  view that U.S.  and foreign 
goods are close substitutes, and that therefore  the equilibrium  relative 
price  is unrelated  to the trade  balance,  is very far  from  the truth. 
TRADE  PRICES 
Tables 4 and 5 present estimates of the effects of the exchange rate 
on prices of U.S. nonagricultural  exports and nonoil imports, respec- 
tively. In each case the dependent variable is the price of the good 
deflated  by U.S. wholesale prices for manufactured  goods-the  same 
price  deflator  used in constructing  the real  exchange  rate  index. Like the 
trade volume equations, both equations are estimated over both the 
shorter  period  leading  up to the dollar's  peak  and  the period  up  to 1986:4. 
At first  sight  the export  price equation  and the import  price equation 
appear  analogous,  with the real  exchange  rate  affecting  both the relative Paul R.  Krugman and Richard E. Baldwin  21 
Table 5.  Determinants of Nonoil Import Prices, Selected Periods,  1976:2-1986:4a 
Independent  variable  Elasticity 
and summary statistic  1976:2-1985:1  1976:2-1986:4 
Real exchange  rate (sum of lags)  -0.98  (0.05)  -  1.07 (0.05) 
Lags: 0  -0.52  (0.06)  -0.27  (0.05) 
1  -  0.31 (0.02)  -  0.24 (0.02) 
2  -0.15  (0.01)  -0.21  (0.01) 
3  -  0.04 (0.03)  -  0.17 (0.02) 
4  0.02 (0.03)  -0.12  (0.02) 
5  0.03 (0.02)  -0.06  (0.02) 
Summary statistic 
Rj2  0.95  0.93 
Standard error  0.016  0.018 
Durbin-Watson  0.52  0.26 
Source: Same  as table  4. 
a. Quarterly  data. Dependent  variable  is the logarithm  of the ratio of the U.S. nonoil import  deflator  to U.S. 
manufactures  wholesale  prices. The real  exchange  rate  expresses  the ratio  of the dollar  price  of U.S. goods to the 
dollar  prnce  of foreign  goods. It is calculated  as described  in table 1. Numbers  in parentheses  are standard  errors. 
import and export prices with a substantial  lag. However, the setup 
actually  embodies  a major  asymmetry  in the timing  of import  and  export 
price responses. On the import  side, a decline in the dollar  is reflected 
only gradually  in a rise in dollar  import  prices, and thus reflected  only 
gradually  in a rise in the relative price of foreign goods. On the export 
side, a decline in the dollar  is at first met with no change in the dollar 
price of U.S. exports, and thus with an immediate  fall in the price of 
U.S.  goods relative to foreign goods. Only over time is there some 
upward  adjustment  in U.S. goods prices. 
This asymmetry  between export  and  import  pricing  reflects  observed 
price behavior, as the contrast between the United States and Japan 
makes  clear. Japanese  export  prices  in yen have fallen  sharply;  in effect. 
the Japanese  have chosen to cut into profit margins  first, think about 
raising  dollar  prices  later.  By contrast,  U. S. export  prices  in dollars  have 
remained  flat;  that is, U.S. firms  do not seem to hold their  prices stable 
in foreign  currency. 
The reason for the asymmetry  probably  lies both in the size of the 
United  States  and  in  the special  role  of the dollar  in  international  markets. 
As we will argue  later,  lags in the effect of exchange  rates  on both  prices 
and  quantities  in international  trade  are  best explained  as consequences 
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Pricing  behavior  in these implicit  contracts  presumably  reflects  the same 
considerations  that  affect more  formal  invoicing  decisions, in which the 
choice of invoice currency  reflects  three  broad  rules. First, other  things 
equal, invoice in the exporter's currency;  second, other things equal, 
invoice in the currency  of the larger  trading  partner;  third,  use dollars 
where both parties  are small countries. Since the United States is both 
large  and  the key currency  country,  the bulk  of U.S. trade  is invoiced in 
dollars  on both the import  and export side. It appears  that the same is 
true  for the implicit  contracts  that  govern  trade  pricing.5 
The important  point to note is that in the long run  the exchange rate 
has plausible  effects on prices;  a dollar  depreciation  raises import  prices 
roughly one-for-one while depressing export prices. In the short run 
there are significant  lags in the effect of the exchange rate on prices. 
These lags help explain why the decline of the dollar  has not yet been 
seen in a corresponding  rise in import  prices, especially since the dollar 
rose before it fell, and it has taken time for the effects of that rise to 
appear. However, both equations develop some forecasting  problems 
when extrapolated  out of sample; export prices are overestimated 9 
percent, and  import  prices 9.5 percent. 
THE  SOURCES  OF  THE  TRADE  DEFICIT 
The estimates in tables 1, 2, 4, and 5 allow us to do an accounting 
exercise, asking what the proximate  causes of the trade deficit were. 
Table 6 performs  the exercise by asking the following questions: how 
much  of the  trade  deficit  would  have  been  avoided  if each  of the  proximate 
causes had  been absent?  First, we ask  how much  the 1986:4  deficit  would 
have been reduced  if U.S. and foreign domestic demand  had grown at 
the same rate;  then we ask how much smaller  it would have been if the 
real exchange  rate  had remained  at its 1980:1  level; finally,  we ask what 
would have happened  if both the divergence  in demand  growth  and the 
real  appreciation  had  been avoided. 
Effect  of Differential  Demand  Growth.  It is widely  believed  that a 
major  cause of the trade  deficit  is that  the United States  has grown  much 
more  rapidly  than  the rest of the world  in the 1980s.  Somewhat  surpris- 
5.  See Paul  Krugman,  "The International  Role of the Dollar:  Theory  and  Prospect," 
in John  F. 0. Bilson and  Richard  C. Marston,  eds., Exchange  Rate Theory  and Practice 
(University  of Chicago  Press, 1985),  pp. 261-78. Paul R. Krugman and Richard E. Baldwin  23 
Table  6. Sources  of the Nonagricultural-Nonoil  Trade  Deficit,  1980:1-1986:4 
Billions of 1982  dollars  unless otherwise  indicated 
Change 
with equal  Change 
Actual  U.S.-foreign  with no 
value in  demand  real dollar  Combined 
Measure  1986:4  growtha  appreciationb  change 
Real exports  218  21  27  51 
Real imports  354  - 27  - 36  - 61 
Export prices (index,  1982 =  100)  92  . .  .  2  2 
Import prices  (index,  1982 =  100)  99  ...  6  6 
Nonagricultural-nonoil  trade balance 
Real  -  136  49  63  111 
Nominal  (billions  of dollars)  -  150  50  51  103 
Source: Authors'  calculations  based  on estimates  in tables 1, 2, 4, and  5. Actual  values  for 1986:4  are  from  Suirvey 
of Current Business,  vol.  67 (March 1987). 
a. Assumes  that  both U.S. and  foreign  demand  grew 15  percent  from 1980:1  through  1986:4. 
b. Holding  the exchange  rate  constant  at its 1980:1  level. 
ingly, it turns out that since the first quarter  of 1980  the GNP of U.S. 
trading  partners  weighted by their shares in U.S. export markets  has 
grown  at almost exactly the same rate as U.S. real GNP. The disparity 
between the data and the general  impression  may be explained  by two 
facts. First, the United States experienced a deeper recession in 1982 
and a faster recovery than the rest of the world, so that U.S. growth 
since 1982  appears  significantly  faster. Second, before 1980  U.S. export 
market countries, which included Japan and fast-growing  LDCs, on 
average  grew significantly  faster  than  did  the United States (3.9 percent, 
as compared  with 2.9 percent, annually  from 1973  to 1980). Thus the 
equality  of growth  rates since then does represent  a change relative to 
previous  expectations. 
Also, while output has grown at the same rate in the United States 
and its export markets, demand in U.S.  export markets has indeed 
grown  more  slowly than  it has in the United  States. From 1980:1  through 
1986:4  U.S. real domestic demand  grew 21 percent, while we estimate 
that in U.S.  export markets real demand grew only 11 percent. By 
contrast,  in the 1970s  demand  and output  grew at the same  rates both in 
the United  States and  abroad. 
The estimate  of demand  effects reported  in table 6 makes a counter- 
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from 1980:1  through  1986:4.  Given the other factors pushing  the U.S. 
real  trade  balance  into deficit, such equal  growth  rates  in demand  would 
have implied  significantly  faster growth  in the rest of the world than in 
the United States, as in the 1970s. It is questionable  whether such an 
expectation was reasonable  given the economic difficulties  of Europe 
and the slowing of Japanese economic growth. Thus in our view this 
estimate of the effect of demand in causing the trade deficit is rather 
high. Nonetheless, it is clear that the divergence  in demand  growth  has 
been a significant  factor. On  this estimate  U. S. exports  would  have been 
about 10  percent  higher,  U.S. imports  about  8 percent  lower, with both 
the nominal  and  real  trade  deficits  lower by about  one-third. 
The  Exchange  Rate. The next column  of table 6 reports  what would 
have happened  if the U.S. real exchange rate had remained  at its level 
in the first  quarter  of 1980.  Even though  the dollar's  rise during  the 1980s 
had been all but reversed by the end of 1986,  lagged effects of the rise 
were still in evidence, and a constant 1980:1  real exchange rate would 
have had  large  effects on the volumes  of exports  and  imports.  According 
to the estimates, import  volume would have been 10  percent  less, while 
export volume would have been 12 percent greater. Thus about 45 
percent  of the real  trade  deficit  would not have occurred. 
The effects on the nominal  trade balance are a bit smaller  because 
depreciation  raises import  prices more than it raises export prices and 
thus  creates  a valuation  effect that  runs  counter  to the effect on volumes. 
About  a third  of the nominal  deficit  would  have been avoided  if the dollar 
had  failed  to appreciate. 
The  Residual. The  results  presented  above suggest  that  the exchange 
rate and lower foreign demand  growth do not explain all of the U.S. 
trade  deficit.  Had real  dollar  exchange  rates  remained  at their 1980  level 
and had demand  grown at the same rate in the United States and its 
export  markets,  an important  part  of the trade  deficit  would still be with 
us. The last column  of the table shows that  the combined  effect of equal 
demand  growth  and no real appreciation  would undo only 80 percent  of 
the real trade deficit and two-thirds  of the nominal  trade deficit. This 
residual  is comparable  in importance  to the two basic determinants  that 
we have included in the estimation  and is crucial to the puzzle of the 
persistence  of the trade  deficit  at this point. 
There  are  three  plausible  hypotheses  that  might  explain  why the trade 
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would warrant.  First is that the lags in the adjustment  of trade to the 
exchange  rate  are simply  longer  than  our estimates  suggest-so  that  the 
fact that the trade  deficit  continued  to rise for two years after  the dollar 
began  falling  represented  the  continuing  cumulative  effects of the dollar's 
previous rise. Second is that the well-publicized "competitiveness" 
problems of U.S.  industry, notably lagging productivity  growth and 
diminishing  technological  edge, require  a secular  downward  trend  in the 
real dollar exchange rate, so that the falling dollar  has been chasing a 
moving  target.  A slight  trend  is in effect present  in our  estimates  because 
the estimated  expenditure  elasticity of import  demand  exceeds that of 
export demand,  but exponents of this hypothesis would argue  that the 
effect is larger  than  this. Third  is the possibility  that  the strong  dollar  did 
persistent  damage  to the U.S. trade  position, the hypothesis  of "hyster- 
esis" in the trade  balance. In the remainder  of this paper  we consider 
each of these hypotheses in turn. 
THE  OUTLOOK  FOR  THE  TRADE  DEFICIT 
A natural  question  is what the econometric  analysis predicts  for the 
future  of the U.S. trade  deficit. Figure  6 shows the result of simulating 
the U.S. nonagricultural-nonoil  trade  balance  through  1990:4  under  two 
assumptions:  indefinite  maintenance  of the real exchange  rates of April 
1987  and 2.5 percent growth in the real demand  of both the U.S. and 
rest-of-world  economies. Since the equations  significantly  underpredict 
the trade deficit during 1986, we also show the comparison  between 
actual  and  fitted  values during  1985  and 1986. 
The estimate suggests that the April 1987  exchange rates would lead 
to a significant  reduction in the nonagricultural-nonoil  trade deficit, 
which would fall about $50 billion by the end of  1988. (Because of 
worsening  U.S. terms of trade, this reduction  corresponds  to a consid- 
erably larger reduction  in the real deficit, almost $100 billion in 1982 
dollars.)  However, the  improvement  would  be far  short  of what  is needed 
to restore  the nonagricultural-nonoil  surpluses  of the late 1970s.  Further, 
the improvement  comes to an end in 1989  and then reverses. The main 
reason  for the reversal  is the "gap  factor";  since imports  are  much  larger 
than  exports, even equal  rates of growth  of imports  and exports lead to 
a widening  absolute deficit. To the extent that part  of the present trade 
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Figure 6.  The Nonagricultural-Nonoil Trade Balance, United States,  1985:1-1986:4, 
and Forecast, 1985:1-1990:4 
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Sources:  Authors'  calculations  and Survey of Current Business,  various issues.  See  text description. 
a.  Forecast  assumes  that real exchange  rates are maintained at April  1987 levels  and that both U.S.  and rest-of- 
world real demand grow at 2.5 percent  annually. 
projecting  equal  growth  rates in the future  perpetuates  the effect of this 
output  differential. 
It is interesting  to ask what it would take to balance U.S.  trade, 
although  the answer  is hardly  reliable.  According  to the simple  equations 
presented  here, either  a 15  percent  fall in the dollar  below its April  value 
or a 10  percent  growth  in foreign  aggregate  demand  over and above the 
2.5 percent a year assumed here would be enough to produce a 1989 Paul R.  Krugman and Richard E. Baldwin  27 
balance in nonagricultural-nonoil  trade. One should bear in mind, 
however, that  the equations  are  underpredicting  the current  trade  deficit, 
so these projections  may be underestimates  of the adjustment  needed. 
This is about  as far as one wants to push the conventional  economet- 
rics. The next step is to ask what kind of microeconomic  foundations 
might  underly  the key features  of lags and a secular  downward  trend. 
Behind the Econometrics:  Lags 
In our  version  of conventional  econometrics,  as in all standard  models 
of the trade balance, a key element is the presence of long lags in the 
adjustment  of both  prices  and  volumes  to the exchange  rate.  But  although 
the lags are central  to explaining  the puzzle of a worsening  trade  balance 
in both real  and  nominal  terms  after  early 1985,  they are entirely  ad hoc. 
Can  a plausible  microeconomic  justification  for the lags be offered? 
We begin  by considering  the simplest  view, that  lags represent  short- 
run supply  inelasticity  due to limits on the rate at which physical trade 
flows  can  be changed.  They might,  for  example,  represent  order-delivery 
lags or bottlenecks in distribution.  If the lags take this form, however, 
we ought to find  income effects on trade  prices and lags in the effect of 
income on trade  volumes. We are unable,  however, to find  evidence of 
any such effects. 
We then develop an alternative  view, which emphasizes long-term 
commitments  by importers  to suppliers  and accounts for the fact that 
income  affects  trade  volumes  much  more  rapidly  than  does the exchange 
rate. 
SLOW  ADJUSTMENT  OF  QUANTITIES 
The simplest explanation  of lags in the effect of exchange rates on 
both prices and volumes might  be that the physical trade flows cannot 
be rapidly  adjusted,  or that  it is costly to adjust  them  rapidly.  This  would 
have  the effect of making  the short-run  supply  curve  for  imports  upward- 
sloping  and would lead to slow adjustment  of both prices and volumes 
to an exchange  rate  change.6 
6. The analysis that follows draws on Catherine  L. Mann, "Prices, Profit  Margins, 
and  Exchange  Rates," Federal  Reserve  Bulletin,  vol. 72 (June  1986),  pp. 366-79. 28  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1987 
Figure 7.  Market for U.S.  Imports 
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Figure  7 makes the point. It shows a hypothetical  market  for a U.S. 
imported  good. D is the demand  curve;  Ss is the short-run  import  supply 
curve, while SL is the long-run  supply curve. The steeper slope of Ss 
reflects difficulties associated with adjusting  the volume of imports 
quickly, such as long order-delivery  lags and the need to establish  new 
distribution  networks. In the long run we show supply as perfectly 
elastic, reflecting  the fact that even U.S. imports  are generally  a small 
fraction of world production  of any given good. That is, the upward 
slope of the supply  curve reflects  the inelasticity  of short-run  supply  to 
the United States rather  than  that  to the world  at large. 
A dollar  devaluation  will shift both Ss and SL UP,  so that in the long 
run  the price will rise by the full amount  of the devaluation.  However, 
initially  the inelasticity  of supply will lead to only partial  pass-through Paul R. Krugman and Richard E. Baldwin  29 





of the exchange rate into import  prices. The initial  rise in import  prices 
will  be only  from  E1  to E2.  Over  time  there  will  then  be further  adjustment 
as the supply  adjusts,  leading  to gradually  rising  import  price and  falling 
import  volume, as indicated  by the arrowheads,  until  E3  is reached. 
So far so good. However, this interpretation  has two other implica- 
tions: that domestic demand  in the importing  country should affect its 
import  prices and that the effect of demand  on import  volume should 
also involve a lag comparable  to the lag on the exchange rate. Figure  8 
illustrates  the point. If real expenditure  in the importing  country  rises, 
D will  shift  outward.  The  initial  effect will  be a rise  in the  price  of imports, 
as the equilibrium  shifts  from  E1  to E; import  prices will then fall as the 
supply  curve shifts  out and  equilibrium  moves to E3.  Meanwhile,  import 
volume  will rise only part of its long-run  amount  initially,  then rise for 
some  time  after  the rise in real  demand. 30  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1987 
Table 7.  Tests for Short-Run Import Supply Inelasticity, 1977:2-1986:4a 
Elasticity 
Independent  variable  Import volume 
and summary statistic  (1)  (2)  Import price 
U.S. real expenditure  1.75  1.77  - 0.25 
(0.46)  (0.41)  (0.04) 
Lagged  1.03  0.77  ... 
(0.41)  (0.31) 
Two  lags  ...  0.19  ... 
(0.32) 
Three lags  ..  .  0.04  ... 
(0.34) 
Real exchange  rateb  1.00  1.03  -0.84 
(0.14)  (0.14)  (0.05) 
Summary statistic 
Standard  error  0.026  0.026  0.014 
Durbin-Watson  1.32  1.31  0.45 
R2  0.99  0.99  0.97 
Source: Authors'  calculations.  See text and  tables 1-5. 
a. Quarterly  data. Dependent  variables  are U.S. nonoil imports  (in 1982  prices) and import  prices, which are 
calculated  as the logarithm  of the ratio  of the U.S. nonoil  import  deflator  to U.S. manufactures  wholesale  prices. 
Numbers  in parentheses  are standard  errors. 
b. The real  exchange  rate  expresses  the ratio  of the dollar  price  of U.S. goods  to the dollar  price  of foreign  goods. 
It is calculated  as described  in table 1. For the import  volume  equations,  the real exchange  rate is estimated  as a 
ten-quarter  distributed  lag;  for the import  price  equation,  the variable  is estimated  with six lags. 
This gives us two testable propositions:  effects of aggregate  demand 
on prices and lags in the effect of demand  on volumes. Table 7 reports 
some tests of these propositions. 
The results on prices do not support  the idea that import supply is 
inelastic in the short run. There does not appear  to be any significant 
effect of U.S. aggregate  demand on import  prices. Admittedly, trade 
prices  as measured  are  often  set in  implicit  or  explicit  long-term  contracts 
and may not reflect the shadow price of imports that is relevant to 
demand.  However, the results on quantities  are also unsupportive.  We 
find no evidence of lags in the effect of real expenditure  on imports 
reaching  beyond one quarter. 
As usual, we should  accept econometric  results only if they seem to 
make sense given a broader  view of the way things  seem to work. What 
the results seem to say is a proposition  embodied  in most econometric 
trade  models:  namely,  that  income  effects work  much  more  quickly  than 
price effects. Is this reasonable? Experience suggests that it is. For 
example,  the slump  in 1982  was immediately  reflected  in a decline  in real 
nonoil imports despite the rising dollar; nonoil import volume fell 7 Paul R. Krugman and Richard E. Baldwin  31 
percent  from  1981:4  through  1982:4.  As soon as the U.S. recovery  began, 
import  volume began rising;  from 1982:4  through  1983:4  nonoil import 
volume rose 37.7 percent. Thus demand  effects seem to work through 
very quickly. On the other  hand, the experience  of the last two years is 
as strong  evidence as one could  hope to have of long lags in the response 
of trade  flows to the exchange rate. Thus we need a model that allows 
for a disparity  in the rate of adjustment  of trade flows to income and 
prices. 
IMPLICIT  CONTRACTS 
An interpretation  of trade  that allows quick income effects but slow 
price effects is the following:  importers  make fairly  long-term  commit- 
ments about whom  to buy from, but not about  how much  they will buy. 
We have come to think  of this as the Book-of-the-Month-Club  model. A 
subscriber  to the Book-of-the-Month  Club  commits  herself to buy only 
a minimum,  above which her purchases may vary quite sharply  from 
quarter  to quarter.  However, she will not arbitrage  on a continual  basis 
between BOMC  and  Quality  Paperback  Books; decisions about  the club 
to which to belong  will come relatively  seldom. 
There  is anecdotal  evidence that  the same  sort  of behavior  takes  place 
in international  trade.  Executives of U. S. firms  to whom  we have spoken 
report  that they make fairly long-term  commitments  to particular  sup- 
pliers and that they are continuing  to fulfill their commitment  to use 
some foreign suppliers  even though  at this point U.S. suppliers  would 
be cheaper. Since the commitment  is to the particular  supplier,  but not 
to the volume  of purchases,  import  volume  may shift  rapidly  in response 
to changes in desired sales. But the composition of demand  between 
domestic  goods and  imports  will shift  only slowly. 
This description seems to lend itself naturally to a Taylor-style 
overlapping  contract formulation, as shown in the following simple 
model. Imports and domestic products compete for consumers; for 
simplicity, we take the total volume demand of consumers as being 
totally inelastic with respect to prices. Thus let Q be the total volume 
demand  for both imports  and import-competing  domestic production; 
we assume 
(5)  Qt=  Q(At), 
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This total demand in turn is divided among domestic and foreign 
goods. We assume  that  each  purchaser  must  decide  once every n periods 
whether  to commit  to a domestic or foreign  supplier.  In each period  the 
fraction  of purchasers  who choose imports  will depend  on the expected 
average  price over the next n periods: 
(6)  t  f(t) 
The natural  next assumption is that there is a distribution  of pur- 
chasers, with a fraction  lln making  the decision each period. The result 
will be that  the volume  of imports,  Mt,  depends  on GNP, Y,  and  on a flat 
distributed  lag on expected prices: 
(7)  Mt=  Q(Yt)[>f(Ptl1), 
or, linearizing  in the logs, 
ln(Mt) =  bo +  b1ln(Yt) +  b2 [  ln(P  )j. 
What  determines  prices? Since there is an implicit  contract  between 
buyer  and  supplier,  a variety  of pricing  behaviors  might  be possible. One 
plausible  candidate  is that  prices are kept fixed in the buyer's currency; 
another  is that they are kept fixed in the seller's currency. In the first 
case, the price will be set in advance and will be proportional  to the 
expected exchange rate; in the second, the price will be unknown,  but 
the expected price will be proportional  to the expected exchange rate. 
Thus  in either  case, we will have 
(8) 
ln(Pe) 
=  k + ln(Ee). 
Finally,  we need to specify exchange  rate  expectations.  Suppose  that 
these expectations  take a simple  regressive  form. That  is, the expected 
exchange  rate over the length  of a commitment  is a weighted  average  of 
the actual exchange rate at the beginning of the commitment  and a 
''normal"  exchange  rate E: 
(9)  ln(Ete)  =  aln(Et) +  (1 -  a)ln(E). 
If a =  1 we have the case of static expectations. Paul R.  Krugman and Richard E. Baldwin  33 
Then the import  volume equation  will take the form 
(10)  ln(Mt)  = bo + bjAt  + b2a>  n(E, -)I. 
This formulation,  in which real demand enters on a current  basis, 
while the exchange rate enters only as a distributed  lag, is capable of 
explaining  fast income but slow exchange  rate effects. 
The trade  price  equation  will depend  on who bears  the exchange  risk. 
If the price is set in supplier  currency, the import price will respond 
immediately  to the actual  exchange  rate: 
(lla)  ln(Pt)  =  k +  ln(Et). 
If the price is set in buyer's currency,  it will have the same overlapping 
contract  structure  as the volume: 
(llb)  ln(Pt)  =  k +  (1/n)  a E  ln(Et-1)i 
If some mix of the two pricing schemes is present, it can be captured 
with the compromise  equation: 
n- 
(lIc)  ln(Pt)  =  k +  wln(Et)  +  (1 -  w)  E  ln(Et11 
i=O 
Now equation 1  Ic is very similar  to the actual equations we have 
estimated, except for the constraint of a "horizontal" lag structure, 
which is itself the result of the arbitrary  assumption  that commitment 
lengths  are the same for all importers,  and we do not wish to impose the 
constraint in practice. Instead, equation 1  Ic  should be  seen as an 
illustration of  how lag structures like those  estimated in standard 
equations  can be justified. 
EXPLAINING  SLOW  TRADE  RESPONSE 
We can now explain the slowness of response of trade flows to the 
falling  dollar.  Taking  first  differences  of equation  10, we have 
(12)  ln(Mt) -  ln(M, -1) 
=  bl[ln(At) -  ln(At-1)] +  b2a[ln(Et) -ln(Et-  A 34  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1987 
The change  in GNP that affects import  volume is from  last quarter;  the 
change in the exchange rate is from n quarters  ago because buyers 
currently  choosing a supplier  are just coming off commitments  made 
some time ago. 
The potential role of lags in explaining  the apparent  paradox of a 
declining  dollar  and a rising  real trade  deficit  can now be seen. Because 
the dollar rose before falling, it was not until late 1985  that exchange 
rates were lower than they were two years previously. Thus buyers 
getting  free of their commitments  in 1985  may still have been switching 
to foreign suppliers, even though the dollar had fallen from its peak, 
because they made  commitments  to domestic suppliers  when the dollar 
was still relatively low. If we imagine  that commitments  extend even 
more than two years, it is possible to argue that this lagged response 
extended some time into 1986. 
If this is the right  interpretation  of lags in the effect of exchange  rates, 
however, a turnaround  should surely have come during 1986. By the 
second quarter  of 1986  the exchange rate was at levels not seen since 
1981;  while there may have been a few long-term  commitments  to U.S. 
suppliers coming to an end and being replaced with commitments  to 
foreign firms, surely most firms considering new commitments  were 
already  facing more favorable  prices from U.S. suppliers  than the last 
time they made  such a choice. Thus  the U.S. trade  balance  should  have 
started to improve, at least in real terms, during 1986; indeed, the 
conventional  econometric  estimates  reported  earlier  in this paper,  when 
estimated up to the dollar's peak and projected forward, do indeed 
predict considerable  improvement  beginning  in the second quarter  of 
1986. Since that improvement  did not take place, we need to turn to 
other  possible explanations  of the trade  deficit's  persistence. 
Does the Dollar Need to Decline Secularly? 
There  is a widespread  belief that  in order  to restore  equilibrium  in the 
U.S. trade  balance, the dollar must not only decline now but continue 
to decline in the future. This view arises from three kinds of evidence: 
the fact that  the roughly  balanced  current  account  that  the United States 
maintained  through  the 1970s  was achieved only through  an exchange 
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end; econometric  estimates that have normally  shown an income elas- 
ticity  of demand  for  U. S. exports  that  is far  less than  the income  elasticity 
of import  demand;  and the sense that the decline in U.S. technological 
and productivity  leadership requires an offsetting decline in relative 
U.S. labor  costs. 
The exchange rate evidence is clear-cut  for the decade of the 1970s. 
For  example,  the International  Monetary  Fund  calculates  five indicators 
of U.S. competitiveness  in manufacturing,  using as price deflators  unit 
labor costs, value-added  deflators, wholesale prices, and export unit 
values.7  All five measures  declined  from 1970  to 1980,  although  the size 
of the decline varies from  37 percent  for relative  unit  labor  costs to only 
13  percent for relative export unit values. For relative unit labor costs 
and  relative  value-added  deflators  the average  real  exchange  rates  at the 
dollar's  peak  were only roughly  comparable  to the rates  of the late 1960s. 
Since the United States kept its current  account  position  relatively  level 
over this period,  the implication  is that  the dollar  consistent  with a given 
trade  balance  was declining  secularly. 
The econometric  evidence comes primarily  from the comparison  of 
export and import  income elasticities of demand.  Until recently nearly 
all studies found that the income elasticity of demand  for U.S. imports 
was considerably  higher  than the income elasticity of export demand; 
this implied  that in order  for imports  and exports to grow at the same 
rate it was necessary to have continuing dollar depreciation.8  This 
disparity  in income elasticities could simply be an accidental  result of 
the mixes of goods that the United States and other countries  produce, 
but it seems unlikely;  many have concluded that the underlying  cause 
has something  to do with the catch-up of the rest of the world to the 
United States in capacity and technology. The widely used Federal 
Reserve model of the trade  balance  includes  a "relative  capacity" term 
designed to capture these factors; when that term was included, the 
income elasticities  became more nearly  equal, but the downward  trend 
7.  IMF, International Financial  Statistics,  1984 Yearbook (IMF, 1984). 
8. The classic reference  on income elasticities  in world  trade,  which  first  pointed  out 
the apparent  need for secular decline in the dollar (and the pound sterling)  is H. S. 
Houthakker  and Steven P. Magee, "Income and Price Elasticities in World Trade," 
Review  of  Economics  and  Statistics,  vol.  51  (May  1969),  pp.  111-25.  The  massive 
subsequent  literature  is surveyed  in Morris  Goldstein  and  Mohsin  S. Khan,  "Income  and 
Price  Effects  in Foreign  Trade,"  in Ronald  W. Jones  and  Peter  B. Kenen,  eds., Handbook 
of International  Economics,  vol. 2 (Amsterdam:  North-Holland,  1985),  pp. 1041-1105. 36  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1987 
Table 8.  Comparative Productivity Levels in Manufacturing, 1973 and 1984 
Index,  United  States  =  100 
United  United 
Year  States  Canada  Japan  France  Germany  Italy  Kingdom 
1973  100  89  56  62  78  67  57 
1984  100  86  93  81  90  84  59 
Source:  Adapted  from  Molly  McUsic,  "U.S.  Manufacturing: Any  Cause  for Alarm?"  Newv  Eniglanid  Econiomic 
Review  (Jan.-Feb.  1987), table 9. 
was reintroduced  by the fact that  capacity  grew more rapidly  in the rest 
of the world  than  in the United States.9 
Our econometrics, using more recent data and somewhat different 
variables  from  most  other  studies,  shows only a small  difference  between 
export and import income elasticities. This by itself would seem to 
suggest that the need for secular  dollar  decline, although  present in the 
1970s,  may have faded away in the 1980s,  as other countries  converged 
on the United States. On  the other  hand, we have seen that  a substantial 
part of the current  deficit remains  unexplained  by our estimated  price 
and income effects. Skepticism about the ability of econometrics to 
separate  the effects of the strong  dollar  from  any  possible secular  decline 
leads us to ask whether  there is other  evidence bearing  on the issue. 
This brings us to the third kind of evidence for the hypothesis of 
secular decline: the diminishing  U.S.  productivity  and technological 
advantage  over competing  nations. The widespread  concern over U.S. 
competitiveness  reflects  not only the trade  deficit, but also the fact that 
U.S.  productivity  is being overtaken by other countries (table 8). In 
addition  to what  has happened  to measured  productivity,  there  is a sense 
that the United States has lost its edge in the introduction  of new 
products. Businessmen and some economists tend to assume that this 
loss of productivity-technological  edge requires a decline in the real 
exchange  rate  over time. However, the conclusion  is not as clear-cut  as 
one might  suppose. 
9. This point was first made by Peter Hooper, "The Stability  of Income and Price 
Elasticities  in U.S. Trade,  1957-1977,"  International  Finance  Discussion  Paper  119  (Board 
of Governors  of the Federal  Reserve System, June 1978).  Hooper  introduced  a "relative 
supply"  variable  measuring  the  ratio  of U.S. and  rest-of-world  capital  stocks.  The  presence 
of this variable  accounts  for the equality  of import  and  export  income  elasticities  found  in 
William  L. Helkie  and  Peter  Hooper, "The U.S. External  Deficit  in the 1980s,"  in Ralph 
C. Bryant and others,  eds.,  Empirical Macroeconomics  for Interdependent  Economies 
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PRODUCTIVITY  AND  THE  REAL  EXCHANGE  RATE 
That other nations are catching up to U.S.  productivity levels is 
undeniable, and the catch-up necessarily requires a decline in U.S. 
relative wages. However, it is not necessarily the case that the decline 
in relative wages must be accompanied  by a decline in the U.S.  real 
exchange  rate, as measured  by the relative  price of U.S. goods. 
To see this, consider  first  the case of a productivity  growth  differential 
between the United States and a competitor country that is uniform 
across all goods. To keep U.S. costs competitive, U.S. relative wages 
must then fall at the rate of the productivity  differential.  However, the 
decline in wages will only keep the relative price of U.S.  goods un- 
changed,  not lead it to fall over time. 
The story becomes more  complex when productivity  grows at differ- 
ent rates in tradable  and  nontradable  sectors. Influential  recent  work  by 
Richard  Marston  has  shown  that  during  the 1970s  the  differential  between 
productivity  growth rates in the United States and Japan was much 
greater  in tradable  than in nontradable  sectors.10  The implication  was 
that one could expect measures of the real exchange rate based on 
aggregate  price  indexes such  as consumer  prices  to show a strong  secular 
trend;  from 1973  to 1983  the U.S.-Japanese  real exchange  rate  based on 
value-added  deflators  in manufacturing  shifted more than 4 percent a 
year  relative  to that  based on consumer  prices. 
In our estimates, however, we have used a real exchange rate index 
that  uses only manufactures  prices, and thus is, we hope, essentially an 
index of tradables.  If there is any trend  in this exchange  rate, it must  be 
because  the difference  in productivity  growth  rates  varies  systematically 
across industries  within  the tradable  sector. 
To see how this can happen, it is helpful to consider a numerical 
example. 
Table  9 shows a case where the tradable  sector can be broken  up into 
three subsectors: high-tech, medium-tech,  and low-tech. For the pur- 
poses of the example we will assume that the United States has a 
sufficiently  large productivity  advantage  in the high-tech  sector that it 
10. Richard  Marston,  "Real Exchange  Rates and Productivity  Growth  in the United 
States  and  Japan,"  in S. Arndt  and  J. D. Richardson,  eds., Real-Financial  Linkages  in the 
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Table 9.  Exchange Rate Trend with Differential Productivity Growth Rates, 
Hypothetical Example, United States and Japan 
Percentage  change 
United 
Sector  States  Japan 
Productivity 
High-tech  2.0  ... 
Medium-tech  2.0  12.0 
Low-tech  ...  4.0 
Wages  5.0  5.0 
Prices 
High-tech  3.0  ... 
Medium-tech  3.0  - 7.0 
Low-tech  ...  1.0 
Exchange  rate  -  10.0  10.0 
Source:  Authors'  calculations.  For a description  of the example,  see  the text. 
faces no Japanese  competition.  We will also assume that  Japanese  wage 
costs are sufficiently  lower that the United States cannot  compete at all 
in the low-tech sector. So the direct  competition  between the countries 
is in the "battlefield"  medium-tech  sector. 
In the example we  suppose that the United States has uniform 
productivity  growth  in the two subsectors in which it produces. In the 
case of Japan,  however, we suppose that the average  8 percent  produc- 
tivity  growth  in tradables  comes from  a 12  percent  growth  in the medium- 
tech sectors averaged  with a 4 percent growth in the low-tech sector. 
U.S. and  Japanese  wages are assumed  to grow 5 percent  a year. 
In this case the prices of both medium-tech  and  high-tech  goods in the 
United States would rise 3 percent  a year. In Japan,  however, medium- 
tech prices would  fall 7 percent  while low-tech prices rise 1 percent. 
Now the point  is that the relevant  competitive  sector is the battlefield 
medium-tech  area.  For U. S. firms  to remain  competitive  here, the dollar 
must now decline 10 percent a year. By almost any aggregative  real 
exchange rate measure, the decline would appear  to be a steady real 
depreciation.  Both a Japanese  unit  labor  cost index and  a manufacturing 
price index would presumably  find a weighted average of the rates of 
price increase in medium-  and low-tech, that is, something  a good deal 
higher  than  the 7 percent  fall in the relevant  sector. Thus  anyone  looking Paul R.  Krugman and Richard E. Baldwin  39 
Table 10. Rates  of Productivity  Growth,  United  States,  Japan, and Germany,  1975-84 
Average annual  percentage  change 
United 
Sector  States  Japan  Germany 
Total economy  1.0  3.5  2.0 
Manufacturing  2.2  6.0  2.4 
Electrical  machinery  4.5  13.2  3.5 
Sources:  Data for the total economy  from Commission  of the European Communities,  "Annual Economic  Review 
1985-86,"  in European Economy,  no. 26 (November  1985), Statistical Annex.  Manufacturing and electrical machinery 
from Organization for Economic  Cooperation and Development,  OECD Economic  Surveys: Japan (OECD, November 
1986). 
only at these aggregates would conclude that the yen was quickly 
becoming  grossly overvalued. 
This  real  depreciation  of the  dollar  is not something  that  has  to happen, 
even if the United States does have slower productivity  growth  than  its 
competitors. It depends on the bias in foreign productivity  growth- 
whether other countries have higher  productivity  growth  in battlefield 
sectors  where  they compete  with  the United  States  than  in sectors where 
they have an established  comparative  advantage. 
International  comparisons  of productivity  growth,  especially by sec- 
tor, are not highly  reliable.  The evidence summarized  in table 10 seems 
to suggest, however, that the case of biased productivity  growth  just 
discussed is relevant, at least in the case of Japan.  The table compares 
rates  of growth  of productivity  at  three  levels of aggregation:  the  economy 
as a whole, the manufacturing  sector as a proxy for tradables, and 
electrical  machinery  as a proxy  for the battlefield  sectors in which  Japan 
in particular  is challenging  the United States. It is clear  for Japan  at least 
that the bias in productivity  growth  helps to explain why the yen may 
need to appreciate  on a secular  basis against  the dollar. 
THE  COUNTERPARTS  OF  THE  POSSIBLE  DOLLAR  DECLINE 
If there  is a secular  decline  in the dollar  due  to differential  productivity 
growth,  we would expect to see the apparent  need for secular decline 
concentrated  in the U.S. exchange rate vis-a-vis the high-productivity 
growth countries of East Asia. Table 11 presents some suggestive 
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Table 11.  Exchange Depreciation and Trade Adjustment,  1980-85 
Real 
currency  Change  in real trade balance 
depreciation  as percent  of GDP 
against  the 
U.S.  dollar  Bilateral  with 
Country  (percent)a  United States  Total 
France  -43  1.1  0.6 
Germany  -  43  1.7  3.9 
Japan  -17  3.9  4.7 
Korea  -  25  6.5  5.7 
Source:  IMF, International  Financial  Statistics,  various  issues. 
a.  Using  relative consumer  prices as deflators. 
currencies  of several  major  U. S. trading  partners  against  the U. S. dollar 
with the change in their trade  balances, both total and with the United 
States alone, as a share of their GDP from 1980  to 1985. It shows that 
while the European  currencies  depreciated  most dramatically,  the shift 
in Europe's  trade  position  with the United States was considerably  less 
than  that  of Japan,  whose currency  appreciated  against  the Europeans', 
and of Korea, which achieved an enormous shift in its trade position. 
The results  are similar  if the countries'  overall  rather  than  bilateral  trade 
balances are compared. The suggestion is that there was an ongoing 
structural  shift that allowed Japan  and Korea to achieve growing  trade 
surpluses  at any given real exchange  rate. 
In table 12  reduced-form  annual  trade  equations  for Japan  and Korea 
explain  the trade  balance  as a share  of GNP by the lagged  real exchange 
rate, industrial  production  relative to all industrial  countries, the real 
price of oil, and a time trend. In Japan's  case the real exchange rate is 
measured  by relative  unit  labor  costs; in Korea's case, it is measured  by 
an index based on consumer  prices. For each country  the time trend  is 
large  and significant,  indicating  some kind of "competitiveness"  factor 
tending to lead to secular appreciation.  For Japan  the secular rate of 
appreciation  would be approximately  5 percent a year if there were no 
difference  in growth  rates of industrial  production;  even if the Japanese 
growth  rate  were to exceed the world  growth  rate  by 3 percent,  an  annual 
appreciation  of more than 2 percent relative to unit labor costs in 
manufacturing  would still be needed to keep the trade surplus from 
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Table 12.  Reduced-Form Trade Balance Equations, Japan and South Korea,  1969-85a 
Independent  variable  South 
and summary statistic  Japan  Korea 
Lagged  real exchange  rate  -0.111  -0.171 
(0.025)  (0.066) 
Relative  industrial  production  - 0.087  0.021 
(0.053)  (0.042) 
Real price of oil  -0.029  -0.103 
(0.008)  (0.026) 
Time trend  0.006  0.014 
(0.001)  (0.006) 
Summary statistic 
K2  0.81  0.81 
Standard  error  0.007  0.02 
Durbin-Watson  1.62  1.60 
Source:  Authors'  calculations  using data from IMF, International  Financial  Statistics.  See  text description. 
a.  Dependent  variable is the ratio of the trade balance  to GNP in each  country.  Real exchange  rates are relative 
unit labor  costs  for Japan,  ratio of  consumer  prices  to  world  export  prices  for  South  Korea.  Relative  industrial 
production is the ratio of domestic  to world industrial production.  The real price of oil is the ratio of the Ras Tanura 
price to world export prices.  Numbers  in parentheses  are standard errors. 
relative  to the economywide  price  level, the required  appreciation  would 
be even larger  by most other measures. In Korea's case the required 
appreciation  is a remarkable  10  percent  a year. 
The distinctive feature of Japan and Korea is their unusually high 
rates of productivity  growth. Thus the evidence is consistent with the 
view that the historical  need for continuing  dollar  decline is related to 
the rapid  rise in relative  productivity  and  technological  capacity  of U.S. 
trading  partners,  especially those in Asia. 
HYSTERESIS 
Many observers have wondered whether the markets lost by the 
United  States  as a result  of the dollar's  strength  can  be recaptured  simply 
by bringing  the dollar back to its previous level. They have worried 
about some form of irreversibility,  in which foreigners, once having 
incurred  the marketing  and distribution  costs necessary to establish 
beachheads  in U.S. markets, are difficult  to dislodge. They worry too 
that  U. S. firms,  having  given  up  and  abandoned  their  beachheads  abroad, 
will find  them  difficult  to regain.  We have offered  a formalization  of this 
concern  with models of "hysteresis" in the trade  balance. 42  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1987 
Table 13.  Tests for Hysteresis, Selected Periods,  1977:2.1986:4a 
Independent  Export  Import  Export  Import 
variable and  volume  volume  volume  volume 
summary statistic  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Real expenditure  2.19  2.85  2.33  2.91 
(0.12)  (0.14)  (0.14)  (0.13) 
Real exchange  rate  -  1.59  0.85  -  1.38  0.88 
(0.12)  (0.14)  (0.12)  (0.14) 
Dummy variable  0.08  0.007  0.029  -0.013 
(0.02)  (0.021)  (0.024)  (0.019) 
Summary statistic 
Standard  error  0.028  0.028  0.033  0.028 
Durbin-Watson  1.07  1.33  0.78  1.36 
K2  0.94  0.99  0.92  0.99 
Source:  Authors'  calculations.  See  text  and tables  1-5. 
a.  The equations  estimated  are reestimates  of the export  and import volume  equations  in tables  1 and 2 with two 
alternative dummy variables  added,  one  equal to  1.0 beginning in 1984:3 (first two  columns)  and the other equal to 
1.0 beginning in 1985:2 (last two columns).  Numbers  in parentheses  are standard errors. 
The idea of hysteresis resulting  from the sustained strength  of the 
dollar  seems highly  plausible  and is supported  by numerous  anecdotes. 
We have not, however, found clear-cut evidence that hysteresis has 
contributed  to the persistence  of the U.S. trade  deficit. 
Table 13  reports  tests of the proposition  that  the strength  of the dollar 
has led to adverse  shifts  in the constant  terms  of the trade  flow  equations. 
We reestimate  the export  and  import  volume equations  of tables 1 and  2 
with  two alternative  dummy  variables:  one beginning  in the third  quarter 
of 1984,  when financial  markets  seem to have concluded  that the dollar 
would be strong  for a prolonged  time, and one beginning  with the onset 
of dollar  decline in 1985:2.  Neither gives any suggestion  of a shift in the 
constant  term  that  adversely  affects the U.S. trade  position;  if anything, 
there  is afavorable shift  in the export  equation. 
Now it is true that by late 1986  the equations  were seriously under- 
predicting  the U.S. real  trade  deficit;  dummy  variables  for 1986  alone do 
show a negative  shift. However, given that  there  is no sign  of an adverse 
shift  during  the period  of the strong  dollar  itself, we have to say that  the 
evidence does not support  the view of hysteresis in the trade  balance. 
The conclusion seems to be that the decline in the exchange rate 
consistent  with trade  balance  reflects  the continuation  of a long-standing 
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Summary and Conclusions 
Most of the U.S. trade deficit results from well-understood  causes. 
Faster  demand  growth  in the United  States  than  in other  countries  would 
have led to a substantial  deficit even if the dollar  had not appreciated; 
lagged effects of the strong  dollar  continue to be a major  source of the 
trade  deficit  even though  the rise of the dollar  from 1980  to 1985  has now 
been reversed.  The failure  of the nominal  trade  deficit  to show improve- 
ment through 1986 was, however, surprising,  as was the only slight 
improvement  in the real trade  balance  toward  the end of the year. This 
sluggish turnaround  may be an indication that the pre-1980 secular 
decline in the equilibrium  dollar has continued through the  1980s, 
although  we have not found supporting  econometric evidence for this 
view. 
Several popular  views about the persistence of the trade  deficit may 
be rejected  on  the  basis  of evidence  and  logic. The  failure  of the  currencies 
of the LDCs to appreciate  against  the dollar  is simply  not quantitatively 
important  enough to explain the trade deficit's persistence; demand 
growth  in foreign  markets  on the scale currently  envisaged  is not likely 
to be enough  to balance  U. S. trade.  Finally,  the common  view that  shifts 
in expenditure  can somehow eliminate  the trade  imbalance  without  real 
exchange  rate  adjustment  is not valid  in a world  where  not all goods and 
services are traded. 
The most important  question  for the future  is whether  the decline in 
U.S. technological  and productivity  advantage  over other nations will 
continue  to translate  into a need for secular  decline in the real  dollar,  as 
it did in the 1970s. This need not be the case; secular  decline depends 
not only on lagging  productivity,  but on a specific  kind  of bias in the lag. Comments 
and Discussion 
Barry Bosworth: In their paper Paul Krugman  and Richard  Baldwin 
evaluate certain key issues in the debate over the causes of, and the 
policy response  to, the recent  development  of a large  and  persistent  U.S. 
current  account deficit. That debate has revolved around  three basic 
questions. First, to what extent can the development  of a trade deficit 
be explained  by predictable  market  responses to the rise in the value of 
the American  dollar  from 1981  to 1985?  If traditional  trade equations, 
which  emphasize  macroeconomic  factors  such  as relative  rates  of income 
growth and relative prices, can explain the pattern of trade that has 
developed over the 1980s,  there would appear  to be little scope for the 
more microeconomic factors that are the focus of the debate over 
competitiveness. 
Second, can the failure  of the trade  balance  to improve  subsequent  to 
the decline of the dollar  be attributed  to normal  lags in the response of 
exports and  imports  to changes  in the exchange  rate? 
Third, is  there a secular deterioration  in the competitiveness of 
American  industry  in world markets-as  reflected  in a trend  decline in 
the real  exchange  rate  required  to maintain  any given trade  balance? 
Krugman  and Baldwin examine these issues within the context of 
their  own small  empirical  model of U.S. trade.  Their  model differs  from 
others  in a few respects. First, while  other  studies  have sought  to explain 
export  and  import  prices as a function  of the real  exchange  rate  and  then 
to incorporate  those price  indexes into equations  that  purport  to explain 
trade volumes, Krugman  and Baldwin  use a reduced form that relates 
trade volumes to the real exchange rate (as measured by wholesale 
manufacturing  prices) directly. Thus, the lag structure  of their volume 
equations  reflects  both the adjustment  of import  prices to the exchange 
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rate  and  the adjustment  of trade  volumes  to prices. They find  that  the lag 
between  a change  in the exchange  rate  and  its effect on imports  stretches 
over nine quarters. 
Second, the import  and  export  equations  both have very high  income 
elasticities  that  tend  to maximize  the importance  of differences  in growth 
rates  relative  to exchange  rates. In my own empirical  experiments  I have 
found strong evidence that the short-run cyclical income elasticity 
exceeds the long-run  elasticity, reducing  the significance  of differences 
in secular  rates of growth  of demand. 
Finally, the authors'  equations  are fitted  over such a short  time span, 
1977-86,  that  it is virtually  impossible  to infer  anything  about  long-term 
trends. I am not sure of their  reason  for ignoring  earlier  periods, since a 
comprehensive  measure  of real  exchange  rates  using  wholesale  prices is 
available  from  Morgan-Guaranty  and  the International  Monetary  Fund. 
Other  studies also have found that the structure  of the trade equations 
has remained  quite stable  over a long period. 
Krugman  and Baldwin do not report their forecast errors  in detail, 
but it would appear  from  figure  6 that the errors  were small  in 1985  and 
1986. I would conclude that their results are in line with other recent 
studies in finding  surprisingly  little room for microeconomic  factors to 
account for the decline in the trade balance.1 They place a greater 
emphasis  than  other studies  on differences  in income growth  relative  to 
exchange rates, but that is mainly because they focus on the fourth 
quarter  of 1986,  when the dollar  had moved back to the 1981  level and 
any remaining  impact  of the exchange  rate  on trade  volumes  was limited 
to the effect of lags. 
Krugman  and Baldwin do find that adjustment  lags cannot fully 
account  for the failure  of the trade  deficit  to improve  in 1986.  They rather 
substantially  underpredict  the trade deficit by late 1986, and they also 
report  a forecast in which the trade deficit persists even with current 
exchange  rates and equal demand  growth  in the United States and the 
rest of the world. They interpret  these results to imply that the United 
States suffers  from a secular  decline in the real exchange rate required 
to maintain  any given trade  balance. 
1. For a summary  of the predictions  from  the trade  blocks of several  macroeconomic 
models,  see Ralph  C. Bryant  and Gerald  Holtham,  "The External  Deficit:  Why?  Where 
Next?  What  Remedy?"  Brookings  Review,  vol. 5 (Spring  1987),  pp. 28-36. 46  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1987 
I do not believe that their arguments  for a secular deterioration  are 
fully convincing. First, the failure  of the trade balance to turn around 
can  be traced  largely  to the failure  of import  and  export  prices  to respond 
fully to the exchange rate decline, not to a failure  of trade volumes to 
respond to the new prices. U.S.  export prices fell about 20 percent 
relative  to domestic output  prices betwen 1982  and 1985.  Krugman  and 
Baldwin  attempt  to relate  much  of that  decline to the exchange  rate and 
expect a substantial  rise  in  export  prices  as the dollar  falls. Some  research 
at the Federal  Reserve by William  Helkie and Peter Hooper, however, 
suggests  that  the apparent  price  decline is a reflection  of the specific  mix 
of products  that the United States exports: an index of domestic prices 
using export weights showed the same magnitude  of decline. On the 
import  side the puzzle is that prices did not rise as rapidly  after 1985  as 
would be expected on the basis of historical  experience. It is not that 
American  purchasers  have failed to respond to the price change; they 
simply have yet to observe much of a change. It appears that trade 
equations  based on actual  export  and  import  prices  do not produce  large 
errors  in late 1986;  the puzzle is explaining  the failure  of prices to adjust. 
Second, although Krugman and Baldwin point out that the real 
exchange rate did fall substantially  between 1970 and 1980, when the 
United States had  a relatively  constant  overall  current  account  balance, 
the total current  account includes the impact of oil price changes that 
are outside the range of their analysis. The nonagricultural,  nonoil 
balance  did  improve  substantially  in 1980,  but  a comparison  that  focuses 
on individual  years can be misleading  because of cyclical fluctuations  in 
the United States  and  abroad.  The more  relevant  type of evidence would 
be a negative trend in the export equation or a positive trend in the 
import  equation-something they did not find for the 1977-86 period. 
They mention the use of a relative capacity variable in the Federal 
Reserve model, but if that is the appropriate  measure  there is no longer 
a significant  difference in the growth of capacity between the United 
States and its major  trading  partners.  Thus, the problem should be of 
reduced  importance  in the future. 
When  I estimated  equations  similar  to those of Krugman  and  Baldwin, 
but extending  from 1967  to 1987,  and  used the real exchange  rate series 
published  by Morgan-Guaranty,  I found evidence of significant  trend 
effects in both the export and import equations that supports their 
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and  opposite in sign. The overall  magnitude  of the effect was very small 
by the 1980s. 
What  remains  is a significant  difference  between  the income  elasticity 
of imports and exports, although the absolute size of the long-term 
coefficients  was much smaller  than  reported  by Krugman  and Baldwin. 
Thus, if the rest of the world does not, as in past decades, grow more 
rapidly  than the United States, there is an implied requirement  for a 
decline in the real exchange rate. Apparently,  however, it results from 
the differences  in income elasticities, and I did not find  in the paper  any 
explanation  why those differences  should  exist. 
Finally, Krugman  and Baldwin  project an improvement  in the U.S. 
trade balance through  1988  but a worsening  in 1989  and beyond. That 
forecast follows directly from their assumptions  that allow the rest of 
the  world  to grow  no faster  than  the United  States. Thus,  the  gap  between 
the level of demand in the United States and abroad that opened up 
between 1980  and 1986  is allowed to persist forever. The magnitude  of 
any secular deterioration  is actually quite small and is represented  by 
the very slow decline in the trade  balance  after 1989. 
More alarming  is the evidence of the buildup of a large structural 
imbalance  in the first half of the 1980s  that will not be eliminated  by a 
return  of the real exchange  rate to the level that  existed at the beginning 
of the decade. The situation  is even worse for  the overall  current  account 
once account  is taken  of the interest  payments  that  must  be made  on the 
foreign  debt that  the United States has accumulated  in the 1980s. 
Peter Hooper: Krugman  and Baldwin have two explanations for the 
persistence  of the U.S. trade  deficit. One concerns adjustment  lags: for 
a variety of reasons largely  consistent with previous experience, trade 
prices  have been slow to adjust  to the dollar's  decline, and  trade  volumes 
have been slow to adjust  to changes in trade prices. This explanation 
suggests that a significant  amount of adjustment  is still to come. The 
other explanation  concerns the authors'  finding  of a secular  downward 
trend  in the dollar's equilibrium  real exchange rate, the exchange rate 
that  is consistent  with external  balance  in the long run.  This explanation 
suggests that despite the depreciation  to date, the dollar may still be 
substantially  above its equilibrium  level. The authors  dismiss as rela- 
tively unimportant  several other possible explanations,  including  most 
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United States. They conclude  that  growth  adjustment  has only a limited 
role to play in correcting  the U.S. external  imbalance. 
One's view of the world can be strongly  influenced  by the way one 
specifies one's empirical model. Unfortunately, as became painfully 
clear in a recent workshop on U.S.  current account models held at 
Brookings,  relatively  modest changes  in specification  can lead to signif- 
icantly different views of the world, or at least of the U.S.  current 
account.  ' 
The  paper's  first  conclusion,  about  lags, should  be generally  accepted. 
As Barry Bosworth has noted, empirical  models of the U.S.  current 
account suggest  that the lags in response to exchange  rate  changes  may 
well have grown  longer  in the recent episode of dollar  depreciation.  By 
the end of 1986  the increase in nonoil import  prices was as much as 5 
percent  less than  the predictions  of the multicountry  model  (MCM)  being 
used at the Federal Reserve Board. Sluggish  demand  abroad  may well 
have induced foreign suppliers  to absorb a more sustained decline in 
their  profit  margins  than  they otherwise  would  have, in order  to maintain 
sales in the U.S. market. 
On the issue  of  lags,  the paper does  a  nice job  of  outlining a 
microeconomic  basis for the price  lags observed  empirically.  However, 
the authors may be too quick to discount the importance of order- 
delivery lags, based on their inability to find significant  lags in the 
adjustment to  income changes. The existence of  significant order- 
delivery  lags would still be consistent with this empirical  result if firms 
in the aggregate  are significantly  better at predicting  income than they 
are at predicting  relative  prices, which seems plausible. 
Although  I am generally  in agreement  with the paper, I would differ 
with the authors on three points: the trend decline in the dollar, the 
importance  of growth  factors in explaining  the persistence of the trade 
deficit, and  the pitfalls  of partial-equilibrium  accounting  exercises. 
First, the notion that the dollar must decline secularly to maintain 
U.S. external  balance goes back at least as far as the late 1960s, when 
Hendrik  Houthakker  and  Steven Magee  found  that  the income  elasticity 
of  U.S.  imports was  significantly greater than the foreign income 
elasticity of demand  for U.S. exports. This elasticity  difference  implied 
1.  See Ralph C. Bryant and others, eds.,  Empirical Macroeconomics  for Interdepen- 
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that  with  constant  relative  growth  rates  across  countries,  ceteris  paribus, 
the U.S. trade  balance  would decline over time. 
A problem  with  the conventional  trade  equations  used  by Houthakker 
and Magee (which include only income and relative prices) is that the 
income coefficient  picks up more  than  it is designed  to. The tremendous 
growth  of U.S. imports  of manufactured  goods from Europe  and Japan 
between the mid-1950s  and the mid-1970s, and the strong growth of 
imports  from developing  countries  more recently, reflected  not  just the 
growth  of U.S. demand  but also a substantial  increase  in manufacturing 
output  capacities  abroad.  For various  reasons these supply-side  devel- 
opments  were not adequately  reflected  in relative  price movements  and 
were strongly  correlated  with the secular  trend  in income. Krugman  and 
Baldwin  attempt  to deal with this specification  problem  by introducing 
a trend  term. They observe a significant  trend coefficient  in the import 
equation  but not the export  equation.  While  the trend  term  does tend to 
reduce the estimated income elasticity for imports, it still leaves the 
conclusion  that  there  is a downward  trend  in the dollar's  equilibrium  real 
exchange rate. The paper offers some explanations  for this downward 
trend  based on differences  in productivity  trends across countries that 
are not adequately  captured  in measures  of aggregate  relative  prices. 
My colleague Bill Helkie and I have handled  this supply-side  issue a 
little differently.  Given that differences in productivity  growth across 
countries  are likely to be closely associated with differences  in rates of 
capital  formation,  we introduced  into our import  and export equations 
the ratio  of the stock of fixed  capital  abroad  to fixed  capital  in the United 
States. This variable  is quite significant  in both the import  and export 
equations. Moreover, it results in a lower income elasticity of U.S. 
imports and a higher income elasticity of U.S.  exports, practically 
eliminating  the difference  between those two elasticities. 
At the same time, however, movements  in the relative capital stock 
variable  differ  from those of a simple time trend. During  the 1960s,  the 
growth  of real  fixed  capital  abroad  exceeded that  in the United States by 
nearly  5  percent  a year  on average,  reflecting  the continuation  of postwar 
investment booms in Europe and Japan. In the  1970s, this growth 
differential  was half  as large, at about  2.5 percent  a year, despite a surge 
in investment in developing countries. Since 1980, the capital stock 
growth  differential  has been reduced  to well under 1  percent  a year, and 
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has been about the same. These data are admittedly  crude. But they 
suggest  that whereas a strong  tendency for the dollar's  equilibrium  real 
exchange rate to decline secularly  may have existed over much of the 
postwar  period,  it does not apply  to more recent history. 
My second difference  with the authors  concerns the importance  of 
relative  growth  to the persistence  of the trade  deficit.  An earlier  version 
of Krugman  and  Baldwin's  paper  presented  a model  in which  import  and 
export volumes were a function of GNPs at home and abroad. The 
authors  noted that since GNP abroad  on average  grew about as fast as 
U.S. GNP during 1980-86, a shortfall  of growth abroad  could not be 
blamed  for the persistence  of the deficit. 
In the present  version of the paper,  domestic  demand,  or GNP minus 
net exports, has been substituted  for GNP as the activity variable  in the 
trade  equations,  with  relatively  little  change  in  elasticity  estimates.  Since 
U.S. domestic demand  grew substantially  faster than  foreign  domestic 
demand during the early 1980s, the authors find that growth factors 
accounted  for as much as one-third  of the widening  of the trade  deficit. 
Given  the structure  of U.S. trade,  the  truth  probably  lies midway  between 
these two extremes. Roughly half of U.S.  trade can be classified as 
finished  goods, for  which  final  domestic  demand  would  be the  appropriate 
activity  variable.  The  other  half  is raw  materials  and  intermediate  goods, 
for which output or GNP would be the more appropriate  variable. In 
empirical  tests with equations  similar  to Krugman  and  Baldwin's,  I have 
found  that  a composite  variable,  which  gives a weight  of 0.5 to both  GNP 
and domestic demand, performs slightly better than either GNP or 
domestic demand  alone. In brief, the growth  factor was significant,  but 
as Krugman  and  Baldwin  suggest, by no means  dominant. 
Third,  I would  add  a note of caution  about  the interpretation  of results 
from partial-equilibrium  accounting  exercises that attempt  to quantify 
causal relationships  among  jointly determined  variables.  Domestic de- 
mand  and GNP are both influenced  by changes in real exchange rates, 
and in opposite directions. (A rise in the dollar depresses net exports 
and  GNP, but  stimulates  domestic  demand,  while  it doesjust  the opposite 
abroad.)  At the same  time, the rise in the dollar  itself has been attributed 
at least in part to the excess of domestic demand  growth  in the United 
States relative to demand  growth abroad,  or more specifically  to U.S. 
fiscal expansion and foreign  fiscal contraction.  In the presence of such 
simultaneity,  partial-equilibrium  accounting  of the effects of growth  and 
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Moreover,  predictions  of the effects of changes in exchange  rates or 
growth on the trade balance can vary considerably  when one extends 
the analysis to a more general framework. At a conference held at 
Brookings  about  a year ago a group  of general-equilibrium  multicountry 
models simulated  the effects of an exogenous decline in the dollar.  At a 
Brookings  workshop  this past January  the U.S. current  account sectors 
of many of the same models ran the same simulation. In the latter 
exercise, a decline in the dollar was found to have powerful positive 
effects on the U.S. current  account  in most cases. In  the former  exercise, 
the same shocks generally  had much  smaller  effects because the decline 
in the dollar  was allowed to influence  other variables,  notably  incomes 
and  prices, which  depressed  the rise in the current  account.  In the MCM 
we find  that  a given real depreciation  of the dollar  can have less than  half 
the current  account  impact  in full model simulation  that  it has in partial- 
equilibrium  simulation  with the current  account sector. This suggests 
that when U.S. external  imbalance  adjustment  takes place it will have 
to be accommodated  by a significant  shift  in relative  domestic  demand. 
Finally, absent  the notion  of a secular  decline in the dollar,  for which 
empirical  support  is mixed at best, the following implications  can be 
drawn from Krugman  and Baldwin's work. Conventional empirical 
models suggest  that substantial  reduction  of the U.S. trade  deficit  could 
involve a significant  further  depreciation  of the dollar at some point, 
though not necessarily. The size of the depreciation  required  would 
depend  on the extent  to which  foreign  growth  increases  relative  to growth 
at home. If exogenous or policy-induced adjustment  in the relative 
growth  of domestic demand  at home and abroad  is not forthcoming,  the 
alternatives  are continued  external  imbalance  or the possibility  of a fall 
in the dollar significantly  below its long-run  equilibrium  level, which 
would  mean  further  adjustment  costs down the road. 
General  Discussion 
Hendrik  Houthakker  did  not find  it at all surprising  that  the U. S. trade 
deficit  had not yet begun  to fall. As previous  research  has shown, trade 
flows respond slowly to changes in exchange rates, and the dollar did 
not peak until early 1985. Houthakker  inferred that improvement  is 
forthcoming, so that policy actions intended to bring about further 
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William Cline agreed with Houthakker's  assessment. He noted that 
recent turning  points in the trade balance have lagged the preceding 
turning  points in the dollar  by two years. The 1978:1  trough  in the trade 
balance followed the 1976:1  peak in the dollar;  the 1980:4  peak in the 
trade  balance  followed the 1978:4  exchange  rate  trough.  Since the dollar 
peaked two years ago, improvements  in the U.S. trade  balance should 
be imminent. 
Stephen  Marris  argued  that  the adverse  trend  in the equilibrium  dollar 
exchange rate, which Krugman  and Baldwin's  paper  relates to relative 
productivity  in export sectors abroad,  has probably  slowed over time, 
just  as Bosworth's comments on the paper indicate. One possible 
explanation  for  a negative  but  shrinking  trend  has  to do with  the evolution 
of consumer  tastes. Initially, consumers exhibit a preference  for local 
products so that the marginal  propensity to import out of additional 
income is very low. At some point, tastes become more international, 
and the propensity to import rises. Marris  suggested that the United 
States might be far along in this process and that U.S.  consumers' 
marginal  propensity  to purchase  foreign  products  may have neared  its 
upper limit, whereas Japanese tastes may just be starting  to become 
more  international.  On  this  thesis, the U. S. trade  balance  should  improve 
more than historical equations predict. Shafiqul Islam took a more 
pessimistic view, arguing  that a lack of nonprice competitiveness is 
largely  responsible  for the secular  decline in the equilibrium  real dollar 
exchange rate and that there is no reason to believe that the trend  will 
not continue  in the foreseeable  future.  Robert  Gordon  observed  that  the 
green revolution and agricultural  reforms  in China, which have made 
developing  countries  more  self-sufficient  in food and  eroded  the demand 
for U.S.  agricultural  exports, would have a permanent  effect on the 
overall trade balance, though not on the nonagricultural,  nonoil trade 
balance  analyzed  by Krugman  and Baldwin. 
There was some debate on the role of growth in foreign demand  in 
bringing  down the U.S. trade deficit. Cline agreed with Krugman  and 
Baldwin that growth in foreign demand, and particularly  growth in 
Japanese demand, was unlikely to have a major effect on the trade 
deficit. He observed  that  the value of U.S. exports to Japan  is currently 
only $20 billion, so that even if each 1 percent increase in Japanese 
income produced  a 3 percent increase in Japanese  imports,  a 1 percent 
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only $600 million, a drop in the bucket compared  with the $170 billion 
U.S. merchandise  trade  deficit.  But Richard  Cooper  pointed  out that  the 
general equilibrium  effects of an increase in foreign demand  could be 
much  larger  than  this sort  of calculation  suggests.  An increase  in demand 
from  Germany  and  Japan  would  raise  raw  materials  prices, which  would 
benefit the LDC suppliers  of these raw materials,  who in turn would 
demand  more U.S. output. 
Rudiger  Dornbusch  observed that different  sorts of expenditure  can 
affect the U.S. trade  deficit  differently.  For example, in Latin  America, 
investment  demand  has declined  much  more  than  total  expenditure,  with 
a correspondingly  large  effect on the demand  for  imports  from  the United 
States. Cooper expanded on this point, noting that investment goods 
account  for a disproportionate  share  of U.S. exports  to most parts  of the 
world and that investment  demand  is more closely linked  to changes in 
expenditure  than to the level of expenditure, so that foreign demand 
stimulation could have a more beneficial effect than Krugman and 
Baldwin's  regressions  suggest. 
Ralph  Bryant reported  on simulations  of a number  of world macro- 
economic  models  conducted  for  aJanuary  symposium  held  at Brookings. 
The simulations  showed that increased foreign demand  could make a 
substantial  contribution  to reducing the trade deficit. According to a 
weighted average of the simulation  results, if foreign demand  grows 1 
percentage  point faster than U.S. demand,  the U.S. trade  deficit  would 
fall $17  billion  after  three  years and  $42  billion  after  five years. The same 
models estimate  that an additional  10  percent  depreciation  of the dollar 
against  the yen and  the European  Monetary  System currencies  could be 
expected to yield a $26  billion  improvement  in the U.S. current  account 
in three  years and  a $35  billion  improvement  in five years. The effects of 
foreign  growth  are of the same  order  of magnitude  as those presented  by 
Krugman  and Baldwin, but, unlike the authors, Bryant  regarded  them 
as sizable and viewed the assumed faster growth  of foreign  demand  as 
realistically  achievable. 
Marris  argued  that the authors  may have given up too easily on the 
hysteresis  idea, and  did not attach  much significance  to the fact that the 
post-1984  dummy  in Krugman  and Baldwin's trade equations  was not 
statistically significant.  A firm that wishes to market its products in 
another  country  must make significant  investments, including  expendi- 
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these investments  are unlikely  to be abandoned  quickly in response to 
exchange rate changes. He noted that the failure of import prices to 
respond  fully  to the  exchange  rate  might  represent  one sign  that  hysteresis 
effects are operating.  William  Nordhaus  reasoned  that the implications 
of hysteresis  effects are important  not only for understanding  the lags in 
the trade  balance  but, more  important,  for assessing the true  costs of the 
policies that led to the overvalued dollar. If the competitiveness of 
exposed U.S.  industries has been permanently  damaged  because in- 
vestment  and technical  progress  by U.S. firms  were slowed by the high 
dollar, then the long-run  costs could be substantially  greater  than  just 
the future  costs of servicing  the foreign  debt on the accumulated  trade 
deficits  of the period.  Edmund  Phelps  pointed  out that  customer-market 
models  imply  that  the dollar  would  now have to stay below normal  levels 
for some time for the United States to regain  its competitive position. 
He was skeptical  that  policymakers  would allow this to happen. 
One striking  feature of Krugman  and Baldwin's analysis, Cooper 
noted, is the sluggishness  in the dollar  price of U.S. imports  when the 
dollar  appreciates  or depreciates.  The conventional  interpretation,  Cooper 
continued, is that foreign producers' profit margins  fatten when the 
dollar appreciates  and shrink  when it depreciates. But even the best 
available  import  price data  ignore  changes  in the ancillary  terms  offered 
by foreign suppliers  associated with changes in the value of the dollar. 
For example, when the dollar  was rising, foreign suppliers  lengthened 
credit terms, absorbed  the costs of transporting  their products within 
the United States, and contributed  to U.S. advertising  budgets, all of 
which lowered the dollar  costs of importing  their products. The threat 
of antidumping  suits made  it attractive  to use these devices and to keep 
invoice prices high. Now that the dollar has fallen, all of this is being 
reversed. 
Catherine  Mann noted that a good part of U.S.  consumer goods 
imports  comes from  countries  whose currency  has not appreciated  much 
against  the dollar;  it is therefore  not surprising  that the dollar  prices of 
these imports have risen very little. In contrast, the dollar prices of 
capital goods imported from Europe and Japan have risen 10 to  15 
percent;  the increase  is not proportional  to the depreciation  of the dollar 
against these currencies, but it is still substantial. In general, Mann 
continued,  disaggregated  price equations  are likely to be more informa- 
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Robert  Gordon  added  that  the various  price  measures  used  in  the  authors' 
regressions and in their calculations of real exchange rates are not 
comparable  either across countries or even within the United States. 
Their results are bound to be sensitive to the price indexes used. The 
problem is especially serious for high-technology  goods, which are 
important  in trade  and  for which quality  improvements  are  treated  quite 
differently  in different  price indexes. 